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Articles

Arguments Advanced By Insureds For
Coverage Of Environmental Claims
Mark C. Raskoff*
I. INTRODUCTION

Both federal and state governments are undertaking efforts to
clean up the environment on a vast scale. Although 1200 sites are
currently on the National Priorities List of sites requiring Superfund
activity, the number of contaminated sites in need of clean-up may
ultimately exceed 30,000. The clean-up of these sites may cost
governmental entities and private parties up to $500 billion and
require fifty years of effort.2 To date, the federal government has
appropriated $8.5 billion to the Superfund program to conduct
remedial investigation studies and fund enforcement efforts.3 With
the clean-up of contamination at some sites costing hundreds of
millions of dollars, the balance of clean-up funding is expected to
come from private sources.
Insurers and businesses view potential responsibility for cleanup costs as posing the threat of an insurance crisis leading to the
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Mr. Raskoff specializes in litigation of environmental coverage disputes. The views expressed herein
should not be construed as having been authorized by any insurer or insured, and are merely intended
to summarize the contentions which have been made by insureds in environmental matters. Similarly,
this article is not intended as an endorsement of the propriety or efficacy of any particular viewpoint
or contention.
1. AcroN, UNDERSTANDING SuPERFUND: A PRoanRss REPORT 25-26 (Rand Corp. Inst. For
Civ. Just. Pub. no. R-3838-ICI, 1989), (citing Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund Progress
Report, Sept. 1988). See Ashley, Representation of the Insurer's Interests In An Environmental
Damage Claim, 54 DEF. CouNs. J. 11, 11 (1987).
2. See Acton supra, note 1; Ashley supra, note 1.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1988) (setting appropriation covering a five year period when
Congress reauthorized CERCLA in 1986).
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possibility of fmancial ruin.4 Not surprisingly, vigorous dispute has
arisen as to whether expenditures to clean up environmental
contamination are a regular business expense as insurers argue, or
a loss covered by insurance as claimed by businesses.
As mentioned previously, environmental cleanup actions involve
potentially huge costs. Coupled with the current conflict in judicial
decisions over what events may result in liability, as well as what
clean-up related expenses may be covered under insurance policies,
both businesses and insurers should attempt to reduce uncertainty
by identifying the issues which may arise and taking the
appropriate steps to resolve such issues.
(Contamination claims may require extensive factual
investigation of divergent events which relate either to the cause of
contamination or to the insurance obtained by the business. These
events, which may have occurred many years before the business
received a demand from a governmental entity to respond to actual
or possible contamination, may have occurred over a long period
of time and may have involved many different individuals.
The best evidence of the cause of contamination and whether
coverage may exist under insurance policies may be contained in
documents that were contemporaneous with the conduct but which,
through the passage of time, have been lost or destroyed. Persons
who are knowledgeable as to the events resulting in contamination
as well as insurance may be deceased or no longer employed by
the business.
This Article intends to provide some insight into the insurance
issues that arise when environmental claims are brought against
businesses. Part II of the Article considers the origin of an
environmental claim against a business and its relation to the issue
of insurance coverage.- Part li suggests practical responses
business insureds may wish to take when faced with a claim by the
government.6 Part IV explores the variety of coverge defenses

4. Abraham, Environmental LiabilityAnd The Limits ofInsurance, 88 COLUM. L REV. 942,

942-943 (1988); Insurance Issues and Superfund, Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th
Cong., Ist Sess. 38 (April 3, 1985) (statement of Wheeler Hess, Vice-President, Travelers Ins. Co.).
5. See infra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 17-72 and accompanying text.
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asserted by insurers and the reaction of courts to such use.7 Part
V raises tactical considerations a business insured will want to
examine when pursuing insurance coverage for environmental
claims.8 Lastly, Part VI examines the possibility for resolving
disputes over coverage for environmental cleanup costs."
II. COMMENCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS AND
INSURANCE BACKGROUND

A. Commencement Of Proceedings Or Claim
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),1 ° the federal
government may request information and an investigation into the
nature and extent of contamination, 1 or may request initiation of
clean-up measures." These measures may be time-consuming and
expensive. Thus, the receipt of a letter or notification may require
the substantial expenditure of both legal fees to deal with the
governmental entity and costs to remedy contamination. Generally,
the longer proceedings continue or are delayed, the more expensive
clean-up measures may become due to inflation and the continued
spread of contamination.
B. GeneralPolicy Coverage
Most businesses purchased general liability policies that were
intended to cover tort liabilities commonly encountered by

7. See infra notes 73-126 and accompanying text.

8. See infra notes 127-148 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
10. 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675 (1988).

11. California similarly authorizes a request for information and investigation of contamination
through either the California Regional Water Quality Control Board, the attorney general, or the
district attorney. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25358.3(a)(1) (West Supp. 1990).

12. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). Many states, such as California, also have statutes
permitting the state to force a responsible party to take appropriate removal or remedial action. See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25358.3(3)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
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businesses. 13 These policies are generally referred to as
"Comprehensive General Liability" policies (hereinafter CGL
policies). 4 In addition, some businesses purchased specialized
insurance policies designed to provide coverage for environmental
contamination claims. 5 These policies are commonly referred to
as "Environmental Impairment Liability" policies (hereinafter EIL
policies). 6 Either policy type may provide some coverage for
environmental claims. Any business faced with environmental
claims must consider the application of either type of insurance
policy to these claims.
III. THE INSURED'S PRACTICAL RESPONSE To A CLAIM

13. Comprehensive general liability policies do not generally cover contractual liabilities except
tort liability assumed by contract, such as indemnification agreements. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.
v. City of Turlock, 170 Cal. App. 3d 988, 995, 216 Cal. Rptr. 796, 802 (1985) (damages for breach
of contract not covered, only tort liability is within the coverage of CGL policy); Int'l Surplus Lines
Ins. Co. v. Devonshire Coverage Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 601, 611, 155 Cal. Rptr. 870, 875 (1979)

(same). See also Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Arciero & Sons, Inc., 146 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 1031,
194 Cal. Rptr. 688, 690 (1983) (CGL policy is not work performance bond and thus does not provide
coverage for insured's defective work); Fresno Economy Import Used Cars, Inc. v. United States Fid.
& Guar. Co., 76 Cal. App. 3d 272, 278-79, 142 Cal. Rptr. 681, 687 (1971) (CGL policy does not
cover damage to work on part made by insured); Knutson Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 396 N.W.2d 229,234 (Minn. 1986) (CGL policy does not cover defective work). See BARNUM,
Liability Principlesin General, CALI. INs. LAW §§ 41.05-41.12 (1989 ed.) (generally discussing
the reasonable expectation doctrine).
14. It is fundamental to note that any insurance policy is an agreement designed to transfer the
risk of accidental loss from one person (the insured) to another (the insurer). Different persons may
receive the benefits of such transference. "First party" policies are designed to compensate the
insured for losses the insured has sustained. "Third party" policies, also referred to as general
liability or public liability, policies such as the comprehensive general liability policies, in contrast,
are designed to compensate thirdpartiesfor losses occasioned by the insured's conduct. KwnToN,
mrrY
INSURANCE, § 10.01 at
INSTuANcE LAw, § 4.8(a) at 232 (1971); 2 LONe, THE LAW OF LL
10-2 (1989); Clifford, PropertyInsurance In General,CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW & PRACrICE,

§ 35.01[3] at 35-6 (1989). This article is necessarily concerned with coverage issues relative to
liability policies.
15. For a general discussion of policyholder expectations relative to environmental matters, see
generallyPeters, Insurance Coverage For Superfund Liability:A Plain Meaning Approach To The
PollutionExclusion Clause, 27 WAsHBURN L.J. 161 (1987); Chesler, Rodburg & Smith, Patternsof
JudicialInterpretationofInsurance CoverageForHazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 RUTOERs Li.
9 (1986).

16. For a general discussion onElL policies and the risks such policies were intended to cover,
see generallyP. Milvy, EnvironmentalImpairmentLiabilityandRiskAssessment, ENVnh. F. 33 (Oct.
1982); A Report by Committee on BusinessManagement with Committee on EnvironmentalControls,
Liability InsuranceAgainst EnvironmentalDamage:A StatusReport-June 1982,38 BUS. LAW. 217
(1982).
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A.

Obtain Records Of Insurance And Conduct Giving Rise To
Claim

Just as the insured's responsibility to the governmental entity is
based on evidence of the insured's conduct, an insurer's
responsibility to the insured is based on evidence of the insurance
agreement executed between the insurer and the insured business.
The starting point in an attempt by a business to establish coverage
for environmental claims centers on obtaining copies of insurance
policies.
Very commonly, a pollution claim will involve conduct
stretching over a multiple year period which commenced many
years before the onset of the claim. Pollution that occurred over a
course of years may implicate multiple policy periods and multiple
insurers. 7 From a practical standpoint, the more insurers that a
potentially liable business may ascertain, the greater the potential
to create a coverage pool adequate to discharge the claimed
liability. Upon receipt of a letter or notification from a
governmental entity, the business should work to locate records that
not only describe the conduct which allegedly gave rise to the
contamination, but also that outline the extent of insurance
coverage.
As a first step in locating relevant documents, a business may
want to review its policies for retaining records. A review of
recordkeeping policies would assist a business in gauging the
potential existence of past records.
Second, businesses may attempt to identify the insurance
brokers who were responsible for obtaining insurance so that a
coverage chronology of potentially responsible insurers may be
developed. The persons who acted on behalf of the business to
obtain insurance may also want to be ascertained and contacted. In
some instances, these individuals might be able to recall the
identity of an insurer or broker involved.

17. See infra notes 103-111 and accompanying text.
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Third, businesses may want to locate documents evidencing
communications made in the course of obtaining the insurance
policies. If EEL insurance was obtained or considered, any
communications relative to this insurance should also be
ascertained.
Once all potentially responsible insurers are ascertained, a
business should notify all known insurers about the claim brought
by a government entity. The insurance broker should be requested
to try and locate responsible claims-handling personnel. Any
information possessed by the insured should be sent to the insurer
t6gether with a request that the person responsible for handling
claims contact the insured as soon as possible so that a meaningful
dialogue can begin.
B. Inability To Find Policies--TacticalConsiderations
If actual copies of insurance policies cannot be ascertained, the
insured should attempt to obtain the information through other
means. In some instances, excess policies may list, by insurer, the
underlying insurance available to the insured during the excess
policy period. Policy numbers may be included on the schedule.
The insurance broker's records may reflect the issuance of policies
through copies of premium payments, ledger card systems, or other
means used to record the issuance of policies.
Generally, the insured has the burden to demonstrate the
potential applicability of coverage"8 and the insurer has the burden
to prove any exclusions to coverage. 9 Some question exists

18. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir.
1980) (where insured unable to prove existence of coverage, insured treated as uninsured for period);
CAl. EViD. CODE, § 1500-1505 (West 1966 & Supp. 1990) (best evidence rule, proofs of writing);
Executive Aviation, Inc. v. Nat'l Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799,806,94 Cal. Rptr. 347,351
(1971) (insured has burden to prove the contract of insurance, its terms, and the loss while insurer
must prove exclusions); State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Spann, 31 Cal. App. 3d 97, 100, 106 Cal. Rptr.
923, 925 (1973) (insured under burden to prove existence of coverage in declaratory relief action).
19. Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 878-880, 587 P.2d 1098, 1105-06, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 285, 292-293 (1978); Ranson v. Penn MuL Life Ins. Co., 43 Cal. 2d 420,426, 274 P.2d 633,
636 (1954); Executive Aviation Inc. v. Nat'l Ing. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 806, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 347,351 (1971); Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Essy, 179 Cal. App. 2d 19,23,3 Cal. Rptr. 586,
588-89 (1960); GAF Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 1989 WL 1761 (ED. La. 1989) (where policy
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whether a policy number, without more, will suffice as evidence of
a policy. Policy numbers may not reflect the type of coverage
actually provided, and, where policy prefixes do not identify the
coverage type, an insurer may contend that the mere policy number
is insufficient to prove that a particular -type of policy, such as a
CGL, was issued.2"
Preparation of a coverage chronology may aid in resolving
questions as to what insurance coverage may have existed during
periods for which policies are initially determined to be missing or
for which the insured has duplicative coverage.21 If the insured is
shown to have purchased insurance from the same insurer before
and after the gap, there may be an argument that coverage was
provided during the gap as well. Similarly, if the insured is shown
generally not to have had an intention to purchase duplicate
coverage, the fact that some coverage within the same coverage
layer overlaps may suggest that a policy was terminated prior to
the stated term. Policy terms may also be proven by policy forms
in use at the time, prior policies, custom and practice, or business
records.' The insured should consider what measures are needed
to prove the existence of insurance policies.

could not be located insurer was under burden to demonstrate existence of pollution exclusion).
20. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1171-72
(W.D.Mich. 1988).
21. The general source for the period wherein the policy is in force and in effect is the
declaration page of the policy. The declaration page generally contains provisions stating "this
policy is effective from (date) to (date)." Generally, modification of this stated term is by
endorsement either renewing, extending, or terminating the stated policy period. As endorsements
may have been issued subsequent to the issuance of the policy, these records may not have been kept
with the policy and may not be available at the time coverage for contamination is questioned. As
a result, coverage gaps or overlapping policy periods may initially be revealed.
22. See, e.g., Abex Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 790 F.2d 119, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (sample
policy form insufficient proof); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North America 667 F.2d 1034,1047 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (duplicate file insufficient proof where appeared many materials missing); Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. Tatum, 5 F.2d 169, 171 (5th Cir. 1925) (parties' course of dealing admissible to prove
contract of insurance); Emons Industries v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 545 F. Supp. 185, 189 (S.D. N.Y.
1982) (writing that states coverage policy limits is sufficient proof); Clenedenin v. Benson, 117 Cal.
App. 674, 678, 4 P.2d 616 (1931) (copy of policy admissible after showing diligent search to locate
original); Fraser v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 165 Wash. 667, 5 P.2d 978, 979 (1931) (testimony
that copy of policy was of same form as original is sufficient proof).

777

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
The inability to establish the existence of coverage may create
a period for which there is no coverage.23 Under some decisions,
the insured may be held responsible for a proportionate share of the
damages caused by conduct during this uninsured period.24
C. Designation Of Insurers To Defend
1. Introduction
To understand issues related to the duty of insurers to defend
claims and potentially pay clean-up expenses, the nature of
coverage provided by a policy must be examined. Certain insurers
duties may be called into play unless and until other insurance has
been exhausted.
2. Excess Versus Primary Coverage
Primary insurance provides coverage up to the limits of a loss
without stating that the policy is to apply only subject to the
exhaustion of any other policy. Excess insurance refers to a policy
of insurance that was issued to cover any loss in excess of another
policy, often referred as "underlying insurance." Generally, excess
insurance will not be called into play unless the policy limits of the
underlying insurance have been exhausted.2- Many excess

23. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212, 1224-1225 (6th Cir.
1980).
24. For cases in which the insured was held not responsible, see Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (insurers jointly and severally liable irrespective of
coverage gaps); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1515, 1525 (D.D.C.
1984 ) (suggesting the same in dicta); Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee. v. Am. Assurance Co., 613
F. Supp. 1549, 1562-63 (D.NJ. 1985), vacated 864 F.2d 1033 (3rd Cir. 1988); Dayton Ind. Sch. Dist.
v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1411 (E.D. Tex. 1988), vacated, 896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.
1989). For cases in which the insured was held responsible, see Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
Insulation, 633 F.2d 1212, 1222 (6th Cir. 1980); clarifled on reh'g., 657 F.2d 814 (6th Ci. 1981),
cert. denied,454 U.S. 1109 (1981); Budd Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 820 F.2d 787, 790 (6th Cir.
1987).
25. See, e.g., Signal Cos. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 359, 367-69, 612 P.2d 889, 894-95,
165 Cal. Rptr. 799, 804-805 (1980) (excess insurer not obligated for defense costs until primary
policy exhausted); McConnell v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 56 Cal. 2d 637, 365 P.2d 418,
424, 16 Cal. Rptr. 362,368 (1961) (excess insurer not obligated until all primary insurance exhausted
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insurance policies have a "Schedule of Underlying Insurance"
listing primary insurance, underlying insurance, or both. Excess
coverage may also be referred to as "following form" insurance
because the terms of coverage incorporate by reference the
underlying coverage forms and thus "follow the form" of the
underlying policies.
A second type of excess insurance is referred to as "umbrella"
excess insurance.6 Typically, this coverage includes two basic
coverage parts, following form excess and umbrella coverage. The
umbrella coverage includes some risks that are not covered by the
underlying coverage. Umbrella coverage is broader than the
underlying coverage because additional risks are covered.
Determining whether underlying coverage is sufficiently
"exhausted" to call into play excess insurance raises a number of
questions.27 Under some circumstances, an umbrella insurer may

even if not specifically listed as underlying); Olympic Ins. Co. v. Employers Surplus Lines Ins. Co.,
126 Cal. App. 3d 593,598, 178 Cal. Rptr. 908, 912 (1981) (same). See also Hartford Ace. & Indem.
Co. v. Continental Nat'l Am. Ins., 861 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 1988) (primary insurer's ceding
limits not exhausted); Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Brocious, 772 F.2d 47, 54 (3rd Cir. 1985)
(umbrella policy did not apply until applicable underlying policies exhausted).
26. See generally Garmany v. Mission Ins. Co., 785 F.2d 941,948 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that
as purpose of excess coverage is to provide higher coverage limits at low cost, primary insurance
must exhaust before insurer's obligations are called into play); Continental Cas. Co. v. Roper Corp.,
173 111.App. 3d 760, 527 N.E.2d 998, 1001-03 (1988) (stating general rule that excess insurance
provides coverage applicable upon exhaustion of primary coverage).
27. In some instances an underlying carrier has sought to claim exhaustion and termination of
a defense duty by tendering the policy limits into court. See Chubb/Pacific Indemnity Group. v. Ins.
Co. of N. Am., 188 Cal. App. 3d 691, 698,233 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543 (1987) (underlying carrier could
not terminate defense obligation and force excess insurer to defend by tendering limits). See also Am.
Family Life Assur. Co. v. U.S. Fire Co., 885 F.2d 826, 836-837 (11th Cir. 1989) (excess insurer
unsuccessfully arguing that primary insurer has primary duty to defend), reh'g den., 892 F.2d 89
(11th Cir. 1989). No justification exists for allowing primary carriers to terminate a defense
obligation by tendering limits absent a settlement or payment of a judgment. First, at the time of
settlement, the primary carrier should be permitted to compel the excess carrier to pay that percentage
of costs attributable to the amount of the settlement or judgment in excess of the primary policy
limits. See Signal Cos. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 359, 369, 612 P.2d 889, 895, 165 Cal. Rptr.
799,805 (1980); Pac. Indem. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 1191, 1198,223 Cal.
Rptr. 312, 317 (1985). Additionally, the primary carrier has set its premium in recognition of the
greater likelihood of defending claims. See Transit Cas. Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124,
132-33, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360, 365 (1979) (subsequently disproved on other grounds in Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Safeway Stores,Inc., 26 Cal.3d 912,921, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709,714,610 P.2d 1038,
1043 (1980)); see also, Pacific Indemnity, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1201, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
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be obligated to provide a defense if a risk is not covered under a
primary insurance policy.'
3. Termination of PrimaryInsurer'sDuties
Generally, the obligations of an insurer are held to be
terminated if the insurer has paid out policy limits in settlement of
a claim or satisfaction of a judgment.29 A number of courts have
held that the duty to defend may continue even after exhaustion of
policy limits. ° As the duty to defend is based on a potential duty
to indemnify, 31 this Article asserts that the better reasoned view

28. See, e.g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Charter Fin. Group, 851 F.2d 957, 960-63 (7th Cir. 1988);
Cranford Ins. Co. v. Allwest Ins. Co., 645 F. Supp. 1440, 1447 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (umbrella insurer
required to drop down to extent primary coverage did not exist); Jostens, Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co.,
387 N.W.2d 161, 167 (Minn. 1986) (umbrella insurer obligated for defense costs attributable to
claims excluded under primary coverage). See also Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d 800, 816,
640 P.2d 764, 772-73, 180 Cal. Rptr, 628, 636-637 (1982) (umbrella insurer required to drop down
subject to insured's payment of limit stated in umbrella policy as underlying policy).
29. Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co. v. Continental Nat. Am. Ins. Cos., 861 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th
Cir. 1988); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 597 F. Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1984), vacated, 631 F.
Supp. 34 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Signal Cos. v. Harbor Ins. Co, 27 Cal. 3d 359, 366-367, 612 P.2d 889,
894, 165 Cal. Rptr. 799, 804 (1980); Pac. Indem. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d
1191, 1198, 223 Cal. Rptr. 312, 317 (1985); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's of London, 56 Cal. App. 3d 791, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1976); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark
Industries 118 IM.2d 23, 514 N.E.2d 150 (1987); Traveler's Indem. Co. v. New England Box Co.,
102 N.H. 380,386, 157 A.2d 765, 769 (1960). See generally Van Vugt, Termination of the Insurer's
Duty to Defend By Exhaustionof Policy Limits, 44 INs. CouNs. J. 254 (1977); Annotation, Liability
Insurer's Duty To Defend Action Against An InsuredAfter Performanceof Its Payment Obligations
Under The Policy, 27 A.L.R.3D 1057 (1969). Some courts have required the absence of prejudice
plus actual exhaustion of policy limits before concluding a duty to defend terminated. See, e.g.,
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Montgomery Trucking Co., 328 F. Supp. 415,416 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Lumbermen's
Mut. Cas. Co. v. McCarthy, 90 N.H. 320,323,8 A.2d 750,752 (1939). See also Commercial Union
Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 789 F.2d 214, 218-19, 221 (3rd Cir. 1986) (terminates upon
exhaustion but orderly withdrawal required); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Borrel-Bigby Elee. Co., 541 So. 2d
139, 141 (Fla. 1989) (good faith in effectuating settlement required); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mead
Corp., 219 Ga. 6, 131 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1964) (insured's consent required before insurer may

terminate defense obligation).
30. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pab. Indem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 140, 144 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (policy
did not condition duty to defend withlrespect to indemnity obligation); ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 576 F. Supp. 936, 942-43 (F.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd 764 F.2d 968 (3rd. Cir. 1985); Kocsc
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 159 NJ. Super. 340, 387 A.2d 1259, 1262 (1978); Delaney v. Vardine
Paratransit, Inc. 132 Misc. 2d 397,504 N.Y.S.2d 70,71 (1986); Exch. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Geiser, 130
Misc. 2d 959, 498 N.Y.S.2d 291, 293 (1986).
31. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 275-76, n.15, 419 P.2d 168, 176, n.15, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 104, 112, n.15 (1966).
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is that the duty to defend terminates upon exhaustion of policy
limits by settlement or satisfaction of judgment.
It is presently unclear whether expenses paid by insurers to
investigate the nature and extent of contamination at a site may be
claimed as indemnity payments that reduce policy limits.32 If
these expenses are viewed as defense costs, no reduction occurs
absent any provisions entitling the insurer to deduct defense costs
from liability limits.
4. Excess Insurer'sDuties
/

A number of questions have arisen relative to excess coverage.
First, an excess insurer may maintain, with considerable legal
justification, that excess insurance does not apply until the
underlying insurance has been exhausted.33 Demands that excess
insurers participate in sharing defense and indemnity costs if
applicable primary insurance exists and has not been exhausted are
not consistent with the nature of excess coverage. Second, excess
insurers may maintain that excess insurance does not apply until all
primary insurance, wherever situated, has been exhausted. 34 Third,
0

32. See, e.g., I.D. Schreiber Cheese Co. v. Standard Milk Co., 457 F.2d 962, 967-68 (8th Cir.
1972) (expenses incurred to determine whether cheese was contaminated covered if test determined
cheese was uncontaminated); Aronson Assocs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania National Cas. Ins. Co., 14 Pa.
D. & C. 3d 1 (1977), aft'd,272 Pa. Super. 606,422 A.2d 689 (1979) (remediation expenses payable
under indemnity provision of policy, to construe otherwise would give inkred coverage windfall);
Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 346 A.2d 210, 213 (1975) (reasonable costs to retain engineer to
evaluate construction defects may be covered). See generally, OSTRANGER & NEWMAN, HANDLING
INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTS 273-74 (3d ed. 1990).
33. See APPELMAN'S INSURANCE LAW & PRACTCE, § 4909.85 (revised ed. 1985); A. WINDT,
INSURANCE CLAIMs & DispUr"s, § 4.11 (2d ed. 1988); OSThANGER & NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON
INSURANCE COVERAGE CASES, § 6.03 (2d ed. 1989).
34. Compare Assoc. Int'l Ins. Co. v. E.D. Bullard Co., No. 530754 (Santa Clara Super. Ct.
March 21, 1988) (excess insurance did not apply until all primary insurance exhausted), reversed,
Associated Int'l Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 692, 269 Cal. Rptr.
485 (1990), peL for rev. den., and decertfiedfrom publication,Aug. 30, 1990 with Ducre v. Mine
Safety Appliances Co., 645 F. Supp. 708, 712 n. 2 (E.D. La. 1986) (excess insurance obligation
arising on exhaustion of primary insurance within policy year rather than by exhaustion of entire
layer of primary insurance); Dayton Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1411
n.23 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (even though all underlying primary insurance has not been exhausted, excess
insurance may be called upon if the underlying insurance for the specific policy period in which the
insured may designate is exhausted and the excess insurance also applies) vacated, 896 F.2d 865 (5th
Cir. 1989).
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if a primary insurer refuses to defend, some courts have held that
an excess insurer's duties are called into play.35 To the extent that
umbrella coverage under an excess policy exists, there is some
question whether a mere refusal by the primary insurer triggers
umbrella coverage if the refusal by the primary carrier appears to
be unreasonable.
5. Insolvent Insurers
In today's business environment, bankrupt insurers are not
uncommon. If the bankrupt insurer is a primary insurer, the
insolvency may force the excess insurer to cover the loss that the
insolvent insurer is unable to cover, depending on pertinent
provisions of the excess policy.36 Thus, if an insurer is insolvent,
excess policy provisions should be reviewed to determine potential
liability under the excess policy.
Insolvency of an insurer may also necessitate the involvement
of a state insurance guaranty association. Typically, these
associations maintain that the guaranty association's duties will not
arise until all insurance, primary or excess, has been exhausted.

35. See, e.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane, 544 F. Supp. 669, 692 (W.D. Wis. 1982);
School Dist. No. 1, Multonnah County v. Mission Ins. Co., 58 Or. App. 692, 716-17, 650 P.2d 929,
944 (1982).
36. Many courts have held that an excess insurer is required to drop down because the
"amounts recoverable" term in excess policy was ambiguous. See Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 30
Cal. 3d 800, 814, 640 P.2d 764, 772, 180 Cal. Rptr. 628, 636 (1982); Donald B. MacNeal Inc. v.
Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 132 Ill. App. 3d 564, 477 N.E. 2d 1322, 1325-26 (1985); Werner
Industries, Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 217 NJ. Super. 436, 526 A.2d 236, 240-41 (1987); Mass.
Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Continental Cas. Co., 399 Mass. 598, 506 N.E. 2d 118, 120 (1987). But
see Golden Isles Hosp., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., Inc., 327 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 1976); TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 685 F. Supp. 156, 157-158 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (holding drop
down not required as matter of public policy); Radar v. Duke Transp., Inc., 492 So. 2d 532, 537 (La.
1986); Continental Marble & Granite Co., Inc. v. Canal Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 1258, 1259 (5th Cir.
1986); Molina v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 574 F.2d 1176, 1178 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding drop down not
required because of expression of intent in excess policy); Steve D. Thompson Trucking, Inc. v. Twin
City Fire Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 309, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1987); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Capital Ford Truck
Sales, Inc., 257 Ga. 77, 355 S.E. 2d 428, 433 (1987); Pergament Distribs., Inc. v. Old Republic Ins.
Co., 128 A.D.2d 760,513 N.Y.S.2d 467,468-69 (1987); Prince Carpentry, Inc. v. Cosmopolitan Mut.
Ins. Co., 124 Misc.2d 919, 929-931, 479 N.Y.S.2d 284, 292-93 (1984).
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Some jurisdictions have rejected this view.3 7 In addition, payment
by a guaranty association may be limited to a specified amount
be less than the policy limits provided by the insolvent
which may
38
insurer.
Insureds may be tempted to seek recovery of expenses from
reinsurance proceeds available under the insurance policies
obtained by insolvent insurers. However, absent any provisions in
the reinsurance policy that specifically entitle the insured to obtain
reinsurance proceeds, 39 recovery has been rejected by a number
of courts' and may be negated by statute.41
6. Designation of Insurers
Vigorous dispute arises when an insured seeks to compel one
insurer rather than all insurers whose policies potentially cover the
risk, to defend or indemnify the insured for a clean-up claim.42 An

37. Washington Ins. Guar. Ass'n. v. Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1160, 1165 (W.D.
Wash. 1988) (state guaranty fund required to pay when layer in which insolvent insurer existed was
called into play); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1511, 1524-25,
235 Cal. Rptr. 185, 191-92 (1987) (guaranty fund and not excess insurer obligated for settlement
costs); McGuire v. Davis Truck Services, Inc., 518 So. 2d 1171, 1173-74 (La. 1988) (excess insurer
obligated for amounts not paid by guaranty fund).
38. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 1063.1 (West 1972 & Supp. 1990) ($500,000 per claim limit).
39. See, e.g., id at § 922.2 (West 1972) (permissive provisions in reinsurance contract and also
provides any right of original insured must be specified in contract).
40. See, e.g., Excess & Cas. Reins. Ass'n. v. Ins. Comm'r, 656 F.2d 491,495 (9th Cir. 1981)
(policyholder had no right to reinsurance proceeds); Ascherman v. Gen. Reins. Corp., 183 Cal. App.
3d 307, 311-12, 228 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1986) (holder of policy not beneficiary under reinsurance
contract); Am. Re-Ins. Co. v. Ins. Comm'n, 527 F. Supp. 444, 453-54 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (nonparty
not entitled to recover reinsurance proceeds); Leffv. NAC Agency, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1426, 1428-29
(E.D. Mich. 1986) (applying California law). See also Am. Home Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
122 Cal. App. 3d 951, 967, 175 Cal. Rptr. 826, 834 (1981) (express intent to make nonparty to
insurance contract beneficiary must be demonstrated before recovery on third party beneficiary
theory). The apparent rationale for this rule is that; (1) the original insured is not an incidental
beneficiary of the reinsurance contract; and (2) the reinsurance proceeds are recoverable by the trustee
for the general benefit of the insolvent insurers estate.
41. SeeCAL INS. CODE § 623 (West 1972) (insured has no interest in proceeds of reinsurance
contract).
42. The leading case supportive of the insured's right to designate carriers is Keene Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1047-48 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S.
1007 (1982). Accord,Dayton Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'I Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1410-11 (E.D.
Tex. 1988), reversed, 896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1990); Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Liee. v. Am.
Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549, 1562-63 (E.D. NJ. 1985), vacated, 864 F.2d 1033 (3rd Cir.
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insured may be motivated to make this designation for tactical
reasons such as to avoid payment of multiple retentions or
deductibles, or simply because all insurers whose policies are called
into play are not willing to participate.
Theoretically, the designation of individual insurers may cause
excess insurance to come into play prior to the exhaustion of
applicable primary policies. This designation may be the result of
either a unilateral allocation by an insurer or a de facto agreement
between the insured and an underlying insurer who issued policies
over a multiple year period, that payments for a loss may be
allocated to a single policy period rather than dividing payments
equally between the insurer's policies in effect during the loss
period.43 An excess insurer will contest designation under these
circumstances by claiming that the payments should be allocated
equally among all involved underlying policies. Excess insurers
may argue that this type of allocation unfairly burdens an excess
insurer, does not represent the underwriting choice made by the
insured, is not equitable, and contravenes the excess nature of
excess coverage.
Some courts have held that the insured may designate coverage
to a specific insurer and the affected insurer can thereafter bring an

N

1988). Whether such a right exists in California is unclear. Currently only trial court resolutions of
this issue have been made. In the Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases,Jud. Council Coordin. Proc.
1072, Phase IV, May 29, 1987, a California trial court ruled that the insured had the right to
designate insurers. See slip op. at 66-67. However, in Crane v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., a trial
court sustained an insurer's motion to strike the assertion of such a right from the insured's complaint
on the basis that such a right was inconsistent with California law in non-continuous occurrence cases
prohibiting arbitrary loss allocation to maximize a loss to an excess insurer. See Crane v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., No. C 736296 (Los Angeles Sup. Ct., Fedruary 5, 1990). See also Kaiser Foundation
Hosp. v. North Star Reins. Corp., 90 Cal. App. 3d 786, 792, 153 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (1979); accord,
Commercial Union Ins. Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 610 P.2d 1038, 1043, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 709, 714 (1980). In the course of the hearing on February 5, 1990, the trial court also
concluded that recognition of such a right would encourage "subjective favoritism" by the insured.
(Reporter's transcript at 1-15). The insured did not seek appellate review of this determination.
43. Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1047-48 (D.C. Cir. 1981); cert den.,
455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Dayton Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1410-11
(E.D. Tex. 1988), reversed, 896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1989); Lae D'Amiante Du Quebec, IAee. v. Am.
Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549, 1562-63 (E.D. NJ. 1985), vacated, 864 F.2d 1033 (3rd Cir.
1988).
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action against other insurers for contribution." In the nonpollution
context, this designation has been rejected by some courts because
it unfairly maximizes an excess insurer's liability." A court which
finds that injuries occurred over an extended period of time might
determine that, as all policies are involved during such period,
designation of a particular insurer is inequitable.4"
7 EIL Insurance
EEL insurance policies are generally issued on a "claims made"
basis which, as a condition of coverage, require the presentation of
a claim within a period specified by the policy.47 Because of this
coverage condition, any business which purchased EIL insurance
should consider whether the business has met the claims reporting
requirement imposed by the policy. If the claim has been made
within the reporting period, and if the pollution was caused by
conduct that occurred over a period of time, the business may want
to consider whether the EIL insurer should be included in any
defense funding agreement, on the basis that it marketed a policy
specifically designed to cover pollution damage. CGL insurers will
clearly attempt to require the participation of the EL carrier. In
cases either where clean-up expenses might not to constitute
"damages" or "property damage," or may be excluded by the
"pollution exclusion," EIL insurance might still be applicable.48
Thus, the insured should consider whether to compel the EIL
insurer to participate in the defense.

44. See, e.g., Dayton Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Tex. 1988),
reversed,896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1989); Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee. v. Am. Assurance Co., 613
F. Supp. 1549, 1562-63 (E.D. NJ. 1985), vacated, 864 F.2d 1033 (3rd Cir. 1988).
45. See, e.g., Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. North Star Reins. Corp., 90 Cal. App. 3d 786, 792, 153
Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (1979) (insured and primary insurer not permitted to allocate losses so as to
maximize excess insurer's liability). Accord Commercial Union Ins. Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26
Cal.3d 912, 920, 610 P.2d 1038, 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 714 (1980).
46. See Nat'l Services, Inds. Inc. v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 661 F.2d 458, 462 (5th Cir.
1981) (if continuous occurrence followed insured must pay deductible in each period).
47. See generally infra note 50 (discussing "claims made" policies).
48. This is so because EIL policies provide coverage for environmental "impairments" rather
than damage to property.
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D. Notification To Insurers
Once all potentially involved insurers have been identified,
notice to the insurer should be given for the obvious reason that an
insurer cannot be called upon to perform until it has received
notice from the insured. Notice to the insurer may also be
important for other reasons.
First, insurance policies may require notice to be given as soon
as reasonably possible after the insured becomes aware of the
pendency of a claim. In some jurisdictions, the failure to give
notice as soon as is reasonably possible may be a basis for a denial
of coverage under the "late notice" defense.49
Second, some insurance policies are denominated as "claims
made" policies". As a condition of coverage under these policies,

49. See, e.g., Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1984);
City of Chicago v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 124 Il. App. 2d 340, 348, 260 N.E.2d 276,280 (1970); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 227, 247, 216 P.2d 606, 616 (1950); New
Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hamblen, 144 Tex. 306,309-10, 190 S.W.2d 56,58 (1945); Harmon v.Farm
Bureau Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 172 Va. 61, 65-66,200 S.E. 616, 618 (1939). See generally OsTRANOER
& NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DIsPuTES at 81-82 (3d ed. 1990). The majority
and California view is that a showing of prejudice is required to support this defense. See Campbell
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 303,305-07,384 P.2d 155, 156-57,32 Cal. Rptr. 827,828-29 (1963);
Moe v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 289, 302, 98 Cal. Rptr. 547, 555 (1971);
OSTRANOER & NEWMAN, supra, at § 4.02[2]; Annotation, Modern StatusQf Rules RequiringLiability
Insurer To Show Prejudice To Escape Liability Because Of Insured's Failure Or Delay In Giving
Notice Of Accident Or Claim, Or In ForwardingSuit Papers,32 A.L.R. 4TH 141 (1984).
50. "Claims made" policies are most typically issued to businesses which provide professional
services, or need specialized coverage. A claims made policy is one in which the insurer agrees to
assume responsibility for any covered act or omission, so long as a claim is made during the policy
period, or such extended reporting period as may be specified in the policy. These policies are in
contrast to "occurrence" policies, which provide coverage for acts or omissions which occur during
the policy period regardless of when a claim is made against the insured. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 535, n.3 (1978); U.S. v. A.C. Strip, 868 F.2d 181, 185 (6th
Cir. 1989); Card v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828, 833 (10th Cir. 1979); Gilliam v. Am. Cas. Co.,
of Reading, Pa., 735 F. Supp. 345, 349-50 (N.D.Cal. 1990); Bums v. Int'l Ins. Co., 709 F. Supp. 187,
189 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Fed. Say & Loan Ins. Corp., 695 F. Supp. 469,479-81
(C.D. Cal. 1987); Brander v. Nabors, 443 F. Supp. 764,767, n.4 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Pacific Ind. Co.
v. Imperial Cas. Co., 176 Cal. App. 3d 622, 626, n.1, 222 Cal. Rptr. 115, 117, n.1 (1986);
Chamberlin v. Smith, 72 Cal. App. 3d 835, 845, n.5, 140 Cal. Rptr. 493, 498, n.5 (1972); Gulf Ins.
Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433 So. 2d 512, 515 (Fla. 1983); Fremont Ind. Co. v. Gierhart, 560
So. 2d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 1990); Zuckerman v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 194 NJ. Super. 206,214-15,
476 A.2d 820, 824-25 (1984); Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 100 NJ. 325, 495 A.2d 406, 410 (1985);
Yancey v. Floyd West & Co., 755 S.W.2d 914, 920 (Tex. 1988) (cases interpreting "occurrence"
policies). See generally,Comment, The Claims Made Dilemma In ProfessionalLiabilityInsurance,
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notice must be given within a specified period of time, commonly
referred to as the reporting period. 51 "Occurrence" policies differ
in that coverage is provided for an act or omission occurring within
the policy period regardless of when a claim is presented.52
Third, if an attorney is retained prior to notification of the
insurer, legal fees incurred during such period may be claimed as
nonreimbursable by the insurer on the ground the insurer's duty to
defend cannot arise until the insurer receives notice, or that counsel
retained by the insured prior to notification has prejudiced the
insurer's interests. It is unclear whether a showing of the lack of
be asserted by the insured to obtain
any actual prejudice may
53
reimbursement of fees.
Therefore, notification to all potentially responsible insurers
should be given as promptly as possible. To preserve evidence of
notice, a business may want to notify an insurer by certified letter.
E. Identify Responsible Insurers And Arrange Meeting With
Insurers' Representatives
Dealing with insurance companies may be frustrating and
unrewarding if the insurers' appropriate decisionmakers are
unknown and out of contact as developments occur and the
government demands responses to requests for action. Similarly,
insurers, as with any business operation, do not welcome demands
for payment without being afforded needed information to make a
reasonable and informed decision. Thus, it is neither in the interest
of the insurance company nor the insured to have a relationship

22 U.C.LA. L REV. 925, 925-26 (1975); Kroll, The ProfessionalLiability Policy "Claims Made,""
13 FoRUM 842, 843 (1978) (discussing claims made policies).
51. See, e.g., Gulf Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433 So. 2d 512, 515-16 (Fla. 1983).
52. See cases cited supra at note 50.
53. See Crist v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 529 F. Supp. 601, 603-04 (C.D. Ut. 1982) (no duty to
defend absent notice); Gulley & Assocs. v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 536 So. 2d 816, 818 (La. 1988)
(prejudice to insurer irrelevant); Cobb v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 488 So. 2d 349, 350 (La.
1986) (insurer not obligated for fees incurred prior to tender); Payton v. St. John, 188 So. 2d 647,
652-53 (La. 1966) (as notice is condition precedent to duty to defend, insurer not obligated for fees
incurred prior to tender). But see Moskau v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 366 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (La. 1978)
(prejudice considered).
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where needed communications cannot occur. For this reason, a
business will want to identify and contact the responsible
decisionmaker at each potentially involved insurance company as
soon as possible. A number of insurance companies have personnel
who specialize in handling environmental claims. To route
correspondence properly, the claim number assigned to the matter
by the insurer should also be ascertained and included in all
correspondence sent to the insurer.
A better dialogue and understanding can be created through
face-to-face dealings rather than through impersonal contact.
Frequently, the vast amounts of factual data required for
consideration in environmental claims favors arranging a meeting
with all potentially involved insurers so that questions can be
answered without undue delay. Because preparation for meetings
is extensive, the most cost effective plan is to arrange a single
meeting with all insurers jointly as soon as reasonably possible. As
new insurers surface, additional meetings may need to be held.
F. Meeting With Insurance Representatives
At the meeting with the insurers, the insured's principal purpose
should be to provide the insurers with the information to allow a
reasoned decision in response to any request by the insured. Thus,
the insured should be prepared to explain what events gave rise to
the contamination, and what measures, including cost, are required
to remedy the contamination.
Because CGL policies usually purchased by businesses are
"occurrence" policies that condition the insurer's responsibility on
conduct and damage occurring during the policy period, insurers
are generally concerned with the date of events.54 The business
should attempt to provide information to the insurers concerning
the dates that the business shipped contaminants to the site or used
contaminants at the site, the volume and toxicity of contaminants,
the extent of contamination, and the process whereby contamination

54. See Abraham, supra note 4 at 964, n. 70; Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263,276 n.15,
419 P.2d 168, 176 n.15, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 111 n.15 (1966).
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occurred or spread. The business may want to provide all
documents describing the cause and the nature and extent of
contamination at the site. To meet any claims of late notice, the
insured should be prepared to provide documents showing the date
that the insured was first informed about the contamination
problem.
Consideration should also be given to informing the insurers of
the status of environmental proceedings by providing copies of all
significant documents arising out of the environmental action.
Actual or projected clean-up efforts should be detailed. In addition,
if any studies or reports of proposed clean-up alternatives or
measures have been conducted these documents should be provided
for inspection by insurers. Because the obligation of insurers may
be affected by other insurance, a coverage chronology would be of
assistance. It should be stated that all information provided in the
course of a joint effort to resist a claim is strictly confidential.55
G. Formulation Of Joint Defense Agreement
The pendency of ongoing environmental proceedings and the
resulting legal expenses will place a substantial financial burden on
the business if the business is asked to absorb all legal fees. These
expenses may be payable by the insurers whose obligations may be
called into play if the potential for coverage is demonstrated. 6 If
numerous policy periods are applicable and a business demands
costs from only one of several potentially available insurers, the
selected insurer may argue that this burden is unreasonable because
each insurer whose obligations are called into play may be claimed
to be jointly and severally liable for defense costs. 57 To act

55. Am. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 579,591-93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561,57273 (1974).
56. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263,276-77,419 P.2d 168, 176,54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 112
(1966).
57. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(insurers jointly and severally liable irrespective of coverage gaps); accord, Budd Company v.
Travelers Ind. Co., 820 F.2d 787, 791 (6th Cir. 1987); Dayton Independent School D. v. National
Gypsum, 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1411, n.24 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (dicta), reversed,896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.
1989); Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee v. American Home Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549,1562-
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reasonably, the insured will want to make efforts to involve all
insurers who have coverage obligations58 and to agree to select a
counsel who is acceptable to both the insured and to the insurers
to represent the insured in the environmental proceedings. The
agreement should include provisions that fees charged by counsel
will be paid by the insurers. Because of uncertainties about
coverage, self-insured periods, or uninsured coverage periods, the
insurers may be unwilling to enter into this type of agreement
unless the business agrees to pay some portion of attorney's fees.
To facilitate the payment of fees by insurers, the business will want
to instruct the attorney to make regular reports to the insurers at
intervals acceptable to the insurers.
H. Defense Undertaken PursuantTo Reservation Of Rights
Presently, no area of the law has more uncertainties regarding
the ultimate resolution of issues than environmental coverage
litigation 59. Uncertainty may be based both on factual questions

63 (D.NJ. 1985), vacated, 864 F.2d 1033 (3rd Cir. 1988); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and
Sur. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1515, 1525 (D.D.C. 1984) (dicta); CNA Cas. of Calif. v. Seaboard Sur. Co.,
176 Cal. App. 3d 598,222 Cal. Rptr. 276, 288-89 (1986); Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases, Phase IV,
S.F. Super. Ct., slip op. Phase V-A, August 28, 1988 at 22-25 (claims predicated on dangerous
installation asbestos trigger coverage from date of installation to date of claim or discovery); Standard
Asbestos Mfg. & Insulating Co. v. Royal Ind. Ins. Co., No. CV 80-14904, slip op. at 19 (Mo. Cir.
Court 1986). But see Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212, 1222
(6th Cir. 1980); clarifiedat reh'g. 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1981), certdenied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981)
(insured responsible).
58. If the ultimate expenses may potentially exceed applicable primary limits, notice should also
be given to excess insurers.
59. Until recently for example, in California, which is viewed as a litigious state with trend
setting precedents, a dispositive decision on whether clean-up expenses constitute damages or
"property damage" covered by a CGL did not yet exist. Appellate courts had reached opposite
results as to whether clean-up expenses are covered. CompareAerojet Gen'l Corp. v. Superior Court,
211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 258 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1989) (response costs covered) with AIU Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1219,262 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1989) (response costs not covered), rev.
granted,782 P.2d 595,264 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1990). The California Supreme Court, however, rendered
a unanimous opinion in AIU v. Superior Courtfinding that cleanup costs may be covered under the
CGL policy. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text (discussing the AIU decision). California
appellate courts have yet to rule on the standard applicable to "occurrence" issues in the pollution
context. No ruling has yet been made as to whether the "sudden and accidental" exception in the
pollution exclusion has a temporal connotation. The only decision to consider the issue in California
held the pollution exclusion inapplicable to contamination caused by fire and did not reach the issue
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and legal issues relating to coverage. From a factual standpoint, the
cause of pollution, the location of the polluting activity on or off
the insured's property, or the timing of the pollution to coincide
with a particular policy period may not be ascertainable until
substantial investigation and hydrogeologic studies have been
conducted. The legal resolution of coverage issues is likewise
unclear.
As noted later in this Article, many coverage defenses may be
asserted by the insurers, including whether a claim has been made
calling into play an insurer's duty to defend and indemnify under
an insurance policy,' whether the costs arising out of clean-up
claim constitute "damages" or "property damage" 6" covered by
an insurance policy, whether the claims are the result of a covered
"occurrence," 62 and whether the date of loss of a claim is within
a particular insurer's policy period.63 The effect of various
64
exclusions in the policy, including the "pollution" exclusion,

of the intent of the exclusion. See Pepper Indus., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 1012,1019,
134 Cal. Rptr. 904, 908 (1977). Conflicting decisions across the country are further evidence of this
uncertainty. For example, a clear conflict exists as to the meaning of the pollution exclusion. See
cases cited infra notes 109-10. There is a clear conflict as to the applicable date of loss theory for
contamination claims. See cases infra notes 97-104. The conflict between the United States Courts
of Appeal as to whether clean-up expenses constitute damages or property damage covered by a CGL
policy indicates yet another conflict. Compare Avondale Industries, Inc. v. Travelers Ind. Co., 887
F.2d 1200, 1207 (2nd. Cir. 1989) andPort of Portland v. Water Qual. Ins. Syndicate, 796 F.2d 1188,
1194 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding clean-up expenses are within the coverage of a CGL policy) with
Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985-987 (8th Cir. 1988)
and Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1988) (clean-up expenses
denied coverage under a CGL policy). Conflicts within a single jurisdiction are common. For
example, conflicting decisions have been reached on whether a duty to defend is created by a letter
from a governmental agency. See cases infra note 79. Compare Central Qual. Serv. Corp. v. Ins.
Co. of N. Am., No. 87-CV-74473-OT (E.D. Mich. 1990) (Mealy's 8/14/90) (PRP letter not a "suit")
with U.S. Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 589, 336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (1983)
(letter requesting action is equivalent to a suit). Still other examples are the conflicting decision on
the meaning of the pollution exclusion within the same jurisdiction. Compare Hayes v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513, 1515 (N.D. Fla. 1988) with Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. U.S. Fid.
& Guar Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541, 1548-49 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
60. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
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the "premises alienated" exclusion,' and "owned property"
exclusion, 6 are also a subject of vigorous dispute.
Because of numerous uncertainties about coverage, insurers may
wish to participate in the claim under a reservation of rights. An
insurer may attempt to reserve rights unilaterally, by the simple
issuance of a reservation of rights letter, or bilaterally, by an
agreement signed both by the insured and the insurer. 7 Currently,
some uncertainty exists whether or not a reservation of rights letter
is sufficient to preserve an insurer's claim of non-coverage.68 The

65. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
66. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
67. The California Supreme Court has noted that a reservation of rights is effective "if the
insureradequately reserves its rights." Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 279, 419 P.2d 168,
178, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 114 (1966) (emphasis added). The California Supreme Court notably did not
specify what circumstances were "'adequate," but left it to the courts to determine what
circumstances were to be deemed "adequate." "As noted by other California courts,'Courts have
in general been fairly liberal in implying reservations."' Insurance Company of the West v.
Haralambos Beverage Co., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1308, 1319, n.5, 241 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432, n.5 (1987)
(citations omitted). Some question exists whether a unilateral reservation of rights letter is
"adequate." See Val's Painting & Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 576, 583, 126
Cal. Rptr. 267, 272-73 (1975) (noting conflict in authority). See also St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v.
Ralee Eng'g Co., 804 F.2d 520,522 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying California law to find that a unilateral
reservation of rights is sufficient); Draft Systems, Inc. v Alspach, 756 F.2d 293, 296 n.2 (3rd Cir.
1985) (reservation of right letter treated same as non-waiver agreement where insured informed that
insurer would seek reimbursement); Am. Home Assur. v. Glenn Estess & Assocs., 763 F.2d 1237,
1239-40 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying Alabama law to find that where bilateral agreement refused,
proper course was to furnish defense pursuant to reservation of rights and seek declaratory relief).
However, where a reservation of rights has been executed and the action would involve litigation of
factual issues bearing on coverage issues, the insured is generally protected with the right to designate
counsel to conduct the defense at the insurer's expense. See CAL. CiV. CODE, § 2860(2) (West Supp.
1991). It is difficult to justify a prohibition on unilateral reservation of rights. Some courts have held
that an insurer has the option of either issuing a reservation of rights or instituting an action for
declaratory relief. Sims v. Illinois National Casualty Co., 43 Ill. App. 2d 184, 199, 193 N.E.2d 123,
130 (1963); Underwriters at Lloyds v. Denali Seafoods, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 721,725-26 (W.D. Wash.
1990); Village Management, Inc. v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 662 F. Supp. 1366, 1373-74 (N.D.
Ill 1987).
68. See Val's Painting & Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 576, 583, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 267, 273 (1975) (not so holding but noting conflict in authority). Some courts have held that
the right to seek reimbursement of attorneys fees must be by bilateral agreement. See Reliance Ins.
Co. v. Alan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 702,708-09,272 Cal. Rptr. 65,70 (1990). Other courts have indicated
unilateral reservations are sufficient. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 804 F.2d 520,
522 (9th Cir. 1986) (must have some expression of intent to reserve right to seek reimbursement of
attorneys fees if potential for coverage not found to exist); Walbrook Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Goshgarian &
Goshgarian, 726 F. Supp. 777, 782-83 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (unilateral reservation of right sufficient);
Omaha Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cardon Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 502, 504-05 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (unilateral
reservation of right sufficient); Draft Systems, Inc. v. Alspach, 756 F.2d 293, 296 n.2 (3rd Cir. 1985);
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majority view, which this Article asserts is the better reasoned
view, recognizes the validity of reservation of rights letters since
they are commonly used and are relatively simple to prepare, as
soon as basic information bearing on the cause and extent of
contamination and on actual or projected clean-up measures has
been given. Recognition of reservation of rights letters also
facilitates the prompt furnishing of a defense. 69 However, a
minority of courts have held that a reservation of rights can be
effective only if contained in a bilateral agreement between the
insurer and the insured.70
If a defense has been undertaken under a reservation of rights
and the litigation concerns issues bearing on the coverage defenses,
a number of jurisdictions permit the insured to appoint independent
counsel at the expense of the insurer.7 Generally, the insured is
entitled to control the litigation. Hopefully, if counsel selected is
acceptable to both the insured and the insurer, no need may exist
to select independent counsel.
A common problem encountered by insureds and insurers in
environmental claims concerns payment of attorney's fees by the
insurer, that is, whether the insurer will pay the rates charged by
counsel selected by the insured, at rates which are higher than

Crawford v. Ranger Ins. Co., 653 F.2d 1248, 1251-53 (9th Cir. 1981) (unilateral letter sufficient);
Am. Home Assur. v. Glenn Estess & Assocs., 763 F.2d 1237, 1239-40 (11th Cir. 1985) (where
bilateral agreement refused, proper course to furnish defense pursuant to reservation of rights and
seek declaratory relief). See also Fulton v. Woodford, 26 Ariz. App. 17, 20, 545 P.2d 979, 982
(1976) (upheld reservation of right to recover additional attorney's fees occasioned in event of
conflict found after insured requested joint representation by single attorney).
69. Because some courts have recognized only a bilateral agreement, if the insured refuses to
sign such an agreement some jurisdictions require the insurer to institute a declaratory relief action.
This view may therefore occasion hardship to the insured. Although declaratory relief actions are
theoretically prompt and quick, where coverage disputes involve multiple insurers or multiple
coverage years such actions are likely to develop into complex litigation. While the declaratory relief
proceedings are pending, the insured would be faced with the prospect of funding the defense of the
environmental proceeding, with right to charge insurers if a potential for coverage is subsequently
found to exist.
70. See supra note 68.
71. See Nike, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 578 F. Supp. 948,951 (N.D. Cal. 1983); San Diego
Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc., Inc, 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 375,208 Cal. Rptr. 494,506
(1984); Executive Aviation, Inc. v. Nat. Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 810, 94 Cal. Rptr.
347, 354 (1971). See generally Annotation, Duty Of InsurerTo Pay ForIndependent Counsel When
Conflict Of Interest Exists Between InsuredAnd Insurer,50 A.L.R. 4TH 932 (1986).
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those charged by insurance panel counsel. Obviously,
environmental litigation is a complex and specialized matter, and
rates higher than typical automobile liability defense rates may be
warranted. The extent of the increase over normal rates is subject
to continued dispute and may be limited by statute.72 An insurer
may be prepared to pay higher rates if the insurer is convinced that
the billing is not inflated, represents a fair accounting of services
rendered, and is split among all insurers whose policies have been
called into play.
IV. COVERAGE DEFENSES

A. Introduction
Once notification has been given to the insurer, the insurer may
assert various defenses to coverage. Fundamental policy
considerations are at the center of the controversy whether CGL
policies provide coverage for environmental claims. It has been
suggested on behalf of businesses that the lack of insurance
coverage for environmental claims may discourage productive
businesses that have a potential impact on the environment.73
Insurers have suggested that coverage for environmental claims
discourages any incentive to avoid losses and pollution of the
environment, and may unjustifiably encourage unduly dangerous
businesses.74 Insurers have also argued that CGL policies were not
intended to provide coverage for pollution resulting from business
activities incurred in the regular course of the insured's business.75

72. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (West Supp. 1991) (limits rates to those actually paid by
the insurer to attorneys retained by the insurer in defense of similar actions). It is presently unclear
whether this provision will effect a retroactive limitation on fees.
73. Abraham, supra note 4, at 944-46; American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 587 F.
Supp. 1549, 1553 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Waste Management of the Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co.,
315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374, 386 (1986)
74. See supranote 73. See also Autotronic Systems, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 89 A.D.2d
401, 456 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505-06 (1982).
75. InsuranceIssues andSuperfund, Com. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 37-42 (April, 1985) (statement of Wheeler Hess, Vice President, Travelers Ins. Co.); id. 154-55
(statement of Richard Schmalz, on behalf of Am. Ins. Ass'n.).
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B. Has A Claim Been Made?
An insurance policy typically promises that the insurer will
defend any "suit.", 76 Thus, if a suit has not been brought, an

insurer may not be obligated to pay attorney's fees or costs to
remedy contamination. 77 Clean-up measures may be undertaken
voluntarily in response to a request by a governmental entity for an
investigation of possible contamination or in response to a threat
of suit by the governmental entity to compel a clean-up73 , or as
the result of actual litigation. Consequently, some dispute exists
whether the insured's voluntary efforts to clean up a site prior to
actual litigation by the governmental entity is in response to a suit
giving rise to the duty to defend.79 If mitigation of damages and

76. "M[The company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking
damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage ....
" ISO form GL 02 02 (Ed. 1-73).
A variety of sources provide a general compilation of commonly used policy forms. See INSURANCE
SERVICES OFFICE, INC., PORTFOLIO OF SAMPLE FoRMs (1986); INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC.,
SPECIAL MULTI-PERIL POLICY-COUNTRYWIDE CATEGORY FoRMs INDEx (1982); NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER, FC&S, THE FIRE, CASUALTY & SURETY BU.LETINS, CASUALTY SURETY VOLUME

(1988); MILER & LEFEBVRE, I MITLER'S STANDARD INSURANCE POuCIES ANNOTATED, "POLICIES"
(1986); GRIFFIN, THE UMBRELLA BOOK (1987).
77. See generally Gibbs v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 22 Utah 2d 263, 265, 451 P.2d
776, 778 (1969) (no duty to pay attorney fees incurred by insured where suit never filed); Fisher v.
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 329 F.2d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 1964) (no duty to pay attorney fees
incurred prior to filing suit); Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1188, n.7 (7th Cir.
1980) (no duty to defend and no duty to pay attorney fees in redressing administrative proposal);
Lofberg v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 264 Cal. App. 2d 306, 308, 70 Cal. Rptr. 269, 270 (1968) (no
duty to defend before service of summons); Marvel Heat Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 325 Mass.
682, 685, 92 N.E.2d 233, 234 (1950) (no breach of duty to defend where insurer declined to defend
prior to suit filed).
78. Typically, a government entity may offer inducements for voluntary compliance such as no
obligation for pre-response administrative expenses; or in the case of multiple parties responsible for
contamination, an offer of percentage responsibility for clean-up costs rather than joint and several
liability for all costs.
79. See, e.g., United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 590, 336
N.W.2d 838, 843 (1983) (letter requesting action equivalent to suit since mere fortuity litigation not
brought); accord,Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich.
1987). See also U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 388-89, 535
N.E.2d 1071, 1079 (1989) (institution of suit rather than letter merely fortuitous choice). But see
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430, 434 (D.Md. 1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 1348, 1353
(rejecting U.S. Aviex holding that letter was claim giving rise to duty to defend); Indus. Steel
Container Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 399 N.W.2d 156, 160 (Minn. 1987) (summary judgment
reversed and trial court directed to consider whether letter constituted claim giving rise to duty to
defend); Technicon Elect. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co. 141 A.D.2d 124, 146, 533 N.Y.S.2d
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prompt funding of clean-up of contamination are viewed as the
paramount policy considerations, courts may deem a letter
requesting either an investigation of the clean-up, or threatening
litigation, equivalent to a "suit" so as to call an insurer's defense
obligation into play. Because of the conflicting decisions on this
issue, it is unclear which view will ultimately be found to be the
majority view.
C. Do The Claims Represent
Damage?"

"Damages"

Or

"Property

One of the most commonly litigated issues concerns whether
clean-up costs and associated expenses constitute "damages" or
"property damage" covered by a CGL insurance policy.80
Insurers have filed summary adjudication motions on the ground
that the pleadings filed by governmental entities seeking restitution
of payments made to clean up a site or seeking to compel clean-up
of the site show a prayer for relief not covered by the policy.
Insureds have also filed motions on the ground that, as a matter of

91, 105 (1988) (letter merely an invitation for voluntary action and was not a "suit").
80. The insuring agreement section of CGL policies typically states:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of:
(A) bodily injury or
(B) property damage
to which this insurance applies caused by an occurrence.
ISO form GL 00 02 (Ed. 1-73). "Property damage" is typically defined as:
(1) [P]hysical injury or destruction of tangible property which occurs during the
policy period, including the loss of use thereof at any time resulting therefrom;
or (2) loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or
destroyed provided such loss of use is caused by an occurrence during the policy
period.
ISO form GL 00 00 (Ed. 1-73). See generally Note, Liability Coverage For "Damages Because Of
PropertyDamage" Underthe Comprehensive GeneralLiabilityPolicy, 68 MINN. L. REv.795 (1984)
(general discussion of the evolution of the CGL policy and the dermitions given to property damage);
Raskoff& Zuckerman, LegalDamages Versus EquitableReliefln CaliforniaPollution Cases: What
Does the Future Hold?, 2 CALIF. INs. LAW & REa. RP'R. 3 (1990) (general discussion of whether
clean-up costs constitute damages or property damage).
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law, clean-up expenses are "damages" or "property damage"
covered by a CGL policy.
Insurers premise their argument from the general rule that CGL
policies are intended to cover tort liability for destruction of
tangible property, and not costs associated with injunctive relief or
restitution."1 Insurers have contended that since CERCLA and
comparable state statutes8 2 empower the governmental entity to
seek to remedy contamination and distinguish between recovery of
costs for clean-up of contamination and recovery for damage to
natural resources," clean-up measures are equivalent to injunctive
or restitutionary relief not covered by a CGL policy.
Insureds, in Tesponse to these contentions, maintain that the
insurers' interpretations of the term "damages" rest on a
hypertechnical legal interpretation not supported by a plain
meaning of the term. 4 Insureds have also argued that clean-up
81. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503-04 (5th Cir. 1955) (no
obligation under insurance policy to pay to remedy nuisance in response to court order); Desrochers
v. New York Cas. Co., 99 N.H. 129, 131, 106 A.2d 196, 198 (1954) (cost to remedy flooding
nuisance not covered); City of Thief River Falls v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 336 N.W.2d 274,275-76
(Minn. 1983) (mandamus action not covered); Bd. of Educ. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 121 III. App.
3d 124, 126-127,459 N.E.2d 273,275 (1984); Hackenthal v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1102,
1110, 234 Cal. Rptr. 853, 857 (1987) (restitutionary payments not covered) Jaffe v. Cranford Ins. Co.,
168 Cal. App. 3d 930,934-35,214 Cal. Rptr. 567,569-70 (1985) (same); O'Neill Investigations, Inc.
v. Ill. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 636 P.2d 1170, 1177 (Alaska 1981) Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Ralph
Williams Northwest Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 740, 504 P.2d 1139, 1143 (1973). See
generally 14 CoucH ON INSURANCE 2D at § 51.37 (1982).
82. Recently, a California court held the state may sue for damage to underground water.
Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1601,1616-18,271
Cal. Rptr. 596, 605-06 (1990). The court based this right either on the government's regulatory
right, or on the basis the state was the owner of the waters within the state. This conclusion, which
cited California Water Code section 102 as the basis for the state's ownership interest may ignore
the scope of section 102, which was limited to waters flowing within watercourses. See CAL WATER
CODE § 102 (West 1971). See also infra note 90 (discussing ownership interest in groundwater).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1988).
84. Insureds have generally contended that, as clean-up expenses are an obligation to pay
money, coverage exists. This argument is not entirely persuasive in view of numerous cases holding
certain types of damages uninsurable, regardless of the belief or expectation of the insured, and
notwithstanding that the damages are a monetary obligation. For example, in California, punitive
damages are uninsurable. See City Prodticts Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 39-42,
151 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499-500 (1979). Restitutionary or injunctive relief damages are uninsurable. See
Nichols v. Great American Ins. Cos., 169 Cal. App. 3d 766, 775, 215 Cal. Rptr. 416, 421 (1985)
(injunctive relief not covered); Jaffe v. Cranford Ins. Co., 168 Cal. Api. 3d 930, 934-35, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 567, 569-571 (1985) (restitutionary damages not covered); Hackenthal v. Nat'l. Cas. Co., 189
Cal. App. 3d 1102, 1110, 234 Cal. Rptr. 853, 857 (1987) (inaccord with Jaffe). Breach of contract
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measures are incurred to mitigate damages.85 A further argument
advanced by insureds is that such expenses are equivalent to the
cost to repair the environment to its uncontaminated state", and
are covered to the same extent that car repair costs are covered.87

88
Judicial decisions in the United States conflict on this issue.

damages are uninsurable. See supra note 14. Damages for mere "economic loss" are also not
covered. See Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 63 Cal. 2d 602, 606-09, 407 P.2d
868,71-73,47 Cal. Rptr. 564,567-69 (1965); Giddings v. Indus. Indem. Co., 112 Cal. App. 3d 213,
218-20, 169 Cal. Rptr. 278, 280-81 (1980). Additionally, damages for defective work of the insured
are not covered See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Coss, 80 Cal. App. 3d 888, 896, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 836, 841 (1978).
85. See Globe Indem. Co. v. State of Calif., 43 Cal. App. 3d 745, 751-52, 118 Cal. Rptr. 75,
79-80 (1974) (expenses incurred to stop the spread of fire, which if not stopped, would have damaged
other homes, were held to be covered). Globe is the most commonly cited case to support this
assertion and it has been applied in the pollution context. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co.,
692 F. Supp. 1171, 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1988), leave to appeal granted, No. 89-15165 (9th Cir. 1989).
Proceedings in Intel were stayed pending the resolution of the clean-up issue by the California
Supreme Court in AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court.
86. See e.g. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 727 F. Supp. 169, 174 (M.D. Pa.
1989); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 1988);
Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 230-31, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621, 629-30
(1989). Paradoxically, some courts have rationalized that the potential disparity between the value
for the loss of the contaminated land and the cost to clean up mandates a conclusion that clean-up
costs are excluded from coverage. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir.
1987) (applying Maryland law). Recently, a California court held that the presence of contaminants
supported a reduced tax valuation of the property. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. County of
Monterey, 223 Cal. App. 3d 382, 391-92, 272 Cal. Rptr. 745, 747-48 (1990). This decision will
undoubtedly be claimed to support the insured's argument that clean-up costs are "damages" since
the diminished value is a measure of damage to tangible property.
87. This argument ignores the fact that costs to repair a car are payments to a private party for
loss and that the government might not be the owner of the contaminated property. This assertion
therefore does not answer the insurer's contention that the clean-up is an equitable remedy.
88. See, e.g., Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 796 F.2d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir.
1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Corp., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1187-94 (N.D. Cal. 1988);
Gloucester Tp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 668 F. Supp. 394,398-99 (D.NJ. 1987); Aerojet-General Corp.
v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 258 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1989); Shell Oil Co. v. Ace. & Cas.
Ins. Co. of Winterthur (Phase I), No. 278953, Memo of Ten. Dec., slip op. at 65-84 (San Mateo
Super. Ct. July 13, 1988); U.S. Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 589-591, 336
N.W.2d 838,842-43 (1983); Lansco, Inc. v. State Env. Prot of NJ., 138 NJ. Super. 275,282-84,350
A.2d 520,524-525 (1975), affid, 145 NJ. Super. 433,368 A.2d 363 (1976); Kutsher's Country Club
v. Lincoln Ins. Co., 119 Misc.2d 889, 891-93, 465 N.Y.S.2d 136, 139 (1983); Evans v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 107 Misc. 2d 710, 712-13, 435 N.Y.S.2d 933, 935 (1981) (clean-up costs covered); Mraz
v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 1986) (not covered on basis that
cleanup costs not "property damage"); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979, 980-81
(4th Cir. 1988); Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharm. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985-986 (8th Cir.
1988); Maryland Cas. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1350 (4th Cir. 1987); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Ross Elec. of Washington, 685 F. Supp. 742, 743 (W.D. Wash. 1988); AIU Ins Co. v. Superior
Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1219, 1234-37,262 Cal. Rptr. 182, 191-93 (1989) (not covered on the basis
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Some courts have held that clean-up costs are covered if there is
damage to property other than that owned by the insured, 9 and
have held that, as groundwater is property owned by the state,
clean-up actions represent a suit for damage to property. 9°

that cleanup costs not "'damages").
89. Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of New York, 218 NJ. Super. 516, 525,
528 A.2d 76, 82 (1987); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 231, 257
Cal. Rptr. 621, 630 (1989); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 487, 426 N.Y.S.2d
603, 604 (1980); Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 231 NJ. Super. 1, 13-15,
554 A.2d 1342, 1348-49 (1989).
90. The California Supreme Court in AIU Ins. Co. v. SuperiorCourt noted that groundwater
was not owned by the landowner but by the state of California, citing to California Water Code
section 102. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 817, n.6, 799 P.2d 1253,1261, n.6, 274
Cal. Rptr. 820, 828, n.6 (1990). Although the first part of this conclusion is entirely consistent with
prior judicial decisions, the second part appears to represent a significant expansion of the property
of the state of California. Prior California judicial decisions have consistently held that one cannot
own groundwater, but only a right to reasonable use. Under English common law, overlying
landowners owned everything that lay directly below the surface of their land. Rules that applied
to water running in streams were not applied to groundwater adjudication because of the belief that
movement of percolating groundwater was unascertainable. In 1903, the California Supreme Court
rejected the common law rule. See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903). The court
recognized that, since groundwater was a limited resource, the rule of absolute ownership would
threaten water resources of the state. In Katz, the California Supreme Court established the doctrine
of reasonable use which limited the rights "to such amount of water as may be necessary for some
useful purpose in connection with the land from which it is taken." Id. at 134, 74 P. at 771. Accord,
Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 174 Cal. App. 3d 74, 83-84, 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 746-47 (1985). The
overlying owner in California has been held to have analogous rights to those of a riparian owner.
See id. at 85, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 748. The rights of the riparian owner are limited to the ordinary and
reasonable use of the water in the stream, and do not include a proprietorship in the corpus of the
water. See Gould v. Eaton, 117 Cal. 539, 542, 49 P. 577, 578 (1897). Therefore, the riparian does
not "own" the water of the stream he "owns" a usufructory right, the right of reasonable use of
the water on his riparian land when he needs it. Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501,555,
81 P.2d 533, 554 (1938). The determination that California owns groundwater seems to conflict with
prior decisions. Under the public trust doctrine developed relative to the right of use of navigable
streams, a governmental entity was held not to "owe rights in groundwater or non-navigable streams.
There is substantial reason to conclude that the public trust doctrine does
not extend to nonnavigable streams to the extent that they do not affect
navigable waters. The public trust doctrine is based upon public access
and usage of navigable waters and pursuant to that doctrine the public has
an easement and servitude upon such waters .... But the public has
never had a common access and usage of non-navigable waterways ...
. That navigability is the measure of the public trust doctrine is indicated
in our Constitution ....
Golden Feather Community Assn. v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 199 Cal. App. 3d 402,408,244 Cal.
Rptr. 830, 833 (1988) (citations omitted).
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In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, the high court considered the relationship
between the public trust doctrine and the appropriative water rights system in California.
Although each system has the potential of occupying the entire field to the exclusion of the
other, the court held the systems must accommodate each other and operate simultaneously.
So construed, the state as sovereign retains continuing supervisory control over its navigable
waters and the lands beneath those waters, and this precludes anyone from obtaining a
vested right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the interests protected by the trust.
Id. at 406, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (citations omitted). But see Locke v. Yorba Irrigation Co., 35 Cal.
2d 205, 211, 217 P.2d 425, 429 (1950) (the right to use water is classified as real property);
Stanislaus Water Co. v. Bachman, 152 Cal. 716, 728, 93 P. 858, 863 (1908) (right to receive water
for irrigation of land was appurtenant to the land and was real property); Fullerton v. State Water
Resources Control Bd. 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 598, 153 Cal. Rptr. 518, 523 (1979). Based on the
decisions above, the supreme court's statement represents a substantial expansion of the state's
ownership rights in groundwater. Irrespective of whether a governmental entity "owns" groundwater,
groundwater quality can be regulated under the police power. The United States Supreme Court has
noted that all property is held subject to the exercise of the police power of the state, which may
regulate its use and enjoyment for the public benefit. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S.
104, 124-25 (1978). See also Gin S. Chow v. Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673,702-703,22 P.2d 5, 16-17
(1933); People ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 753, 126
Cal. Rptr. 851, 857 (1976). There is little doubt that the state may undertake to regulate
environmental quality, notwithstanding the resulting limitation imposed on the free use of property
rights. In California, the source of the state's power is clearly specified in the California Water Code,
which provides, in pertinent part:
The Legislature rinds and declares that the people of the state have a primary
interest in the conservation, control, and utilization of water resources of the state,
and that the quality of all the waters of the state shall be protected for the use and
the enjoyment by the people of the state.
The Legislature further finds and declares that the activities and factors which
may affect the quality of the waters of the state shall be regulated to attain the
highest water quality which is reasonable, considering all the demands being
made and to be made on those waters and the total values involved, beneficial
and detrimental, economic and social, tangible and intangible.
The Legislature further finds and declares that the health, safety and welfare of
the people of the state requires that there be a statewide program for the control
of the quality of all the waters of the state; that the state must be prepared to
exercise its full power and jurisdiction to protect the quality of the waters in the
state from degradation originating inside or outside the boundaries of the state.

CAL. WATER CODE § 13000 (West 1971). Under the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act, the
State Regional Water Quality Control Board is designated as the state water pollution control agency.
Id. § 13160. This board is empowered to institute legal actions to compel a clean-up of contaminated
groundwater. Id. § 13304-(West Supp. 1991). Therefore, exercise of the right to compel clean-up may
in reality be independent of the ownership of the property. As noted in detail below, the assumption
of courts that the state necessarily owns groundwater appears inconsistent with the nature of water
rights in California.

800

Pacific Law Journal/ VoL 22
The California Supreme Court rendered a significant opinion on
the issue of insurance coverage for clean-up costs in AIU Insurance
Co. v. Superior Court.9 The AIU court unanimously ruled that
costs to reimburse government entities for investigation and cleanup of contamination and costs arising out of cessation of
contamination, represented a suit for "damages" because of
"property damage" as those standard terms were used in CGL
policies.92 The court rejected the assertion of insurers that CGL
policies intended to cover costs to reimburse the government
agencies for expenditures or recover for damage to natural
resources but not to cover costs of injunctive relief; the remedies
available under CERCLA93 and other environmental statutes do
not rest on the traditional distinction between damages and
injunctive, or other equitable relief available at common law.9 4
This distinction would exalt form over substance.95 However, the
court stated that injunctive costs which are prophylactic and arise
in anticipation of future contamination are not incurred because of
property damage and are not covered under the policy language.96
The AIU court also rejected the insurer's assertion that allowance
of recovery was not permitted because clean-up costs might exceed
actual or diminished value of the property.97

91. 51 Cal. 3d 807, 799 P.2d 1253, 274 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1990).
92. Under CERCLA and similar statutes, injunctive relief and reimbursement of
response costs serve substantially the same purpose. For this reason, we find the
CGL policy language is ambiguous as applied to remedial and mitigative costs
incurred pursuant to injunction under CERCLA and similar statutes, and therefore
must be construed in favor of coverage to satisfy the reasonable expectations of
the insured.
Id. at 841, 799 P.2d at 1278, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(C) (1988) (CERCLA authorizes a suit for recovery of
damage to natural resources, as well as a suit to compel clean-up of contamination).
94. AU Insurance Co., 51 Cal. 3d at 838-40, 799 P.2d at 1276-77, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 843-44.
95. Id at 840, 799 P.2d at 1277, 274 Cal.Rptr. at 844.
96. "We do agree that prophylactic costs-incurred to pay for measures taken in advance of any
release of hazardous waste-are not incurred 'because of property damage.! Until such damage has
occurred, whether on the waste site itself or ekewhere, there can be no coverage under CGL
policies." Id. at 843, 799 P.2d at 1279-80, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 846-47 (citations omitted).
97. d at 834, 799 P.2d at 1273, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
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Interpreting the language of the CGL policies, the AIU court
rejected both the insured's and insurer's contentions that statements
made in unrelated transactions or litigation, such as joint industry
drafting history, were relevant in determining the meaning of the
terms "damages" or "property damage."98 The court reasoned that,
notwithstanding the unquestioned sophistication and equal
bargaining position of the insured, a "popular and ordinary"
interpretation would be applied to the term "damages" in the
absence of evidence that the parties intended a technical meaning
to apply." The AIU court held that the ordinary and popular
meaning of "damages" would include any monetary obligation
which the insured would be required to pay.1°°
D. Are The Claims The Result OfAn "Occurrence?"
Insurance policies after 1966 typically promise to provide
coverage for bodily injury or property damage caused by an
"occurrence.".... An occurrence is defined as "an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which
results in damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured." 102
Two basic "occurrence" questions are commonly encountered.
First, did the contamination damage occur during the insurer's
policy period? Second, is the contamination "neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured?"

98. Id. at 823, 799 P.2d at 1265, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 825-28, 799 P.2d at 1267-68,274 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35. The breadth of this statement
may be questionable. Prior California decisions have consistently held certain monetary obligations
were not covered, notwithstanding that payment would cause economic loss to the insured. See, e.g.,
Giddings v. Industrial Indem. Co., 112 Cal. App. 3d 213,218-20, 169 Cal. Rptr. 278,280-82 (1980)
(mere economic loss not covered); City Products Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 3942, 151 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498-506 (1979) (punitive damages not covered); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
City of Turlock, 170 Cal. App. 3d 988, 996, 216 Cal Rptr. 796, 800 (1985) (damages for breach of
contract not covered); St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Coss, 80 Cal. App. 3d 888, 896, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 836, 841 (1978) (damage to insured's own product not covered); Jaffe v. Cranford Ins. Co., 168
Cal. App. 3d 930, 934-35, 214 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570-71 (1985) (restitutionary relief not covered).
101. ISO form GL 00 02 (1-73).
102. Id.

802

1991 / Coverage of Environmental Claims

1. What Is the Date of the Occurrence?
Considerable controversy exists over determining the date of an
occurrence for a claim of contamination causing property
damage. 3 Courts have taken various approaches to determine the
date of an occurrence. Under one approach, courts look to the date
of discovery of contamination or injury to determine the date of
occurrence."° This theory is known as the "manifestation
approach." Insurers who contend that the date of discovery
constitutes the date of loss are referred to as taking a manifestation
approach to the date of loss. 5 Because the manifestation

103. The use of the term "property damage" does not presume a court would find clean-up
expenses to constitute "property damage." See supra note 88. The term, however, is used as a rubric
for addressing the issue of the date of occurrence for contamination claims involving property, as
opposed to personal injury.
104. Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., Ltd., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986)
(contamination to property); Eagle-Picher Inds. v. Inc. Liberty Mutual Ins. Company 682 F.2d 12,
24 (1st Cir. 1982), cert.denied 460 U.S. 1028 (1983) (bodily injury). See generally American Home
Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1500-03 (S.D. N.Y. 1983), a d 788 F.2d
760 (1984).
105. Whether the manifestation approach is determinative of an insurer's obligation in both ust
party and third party cases is unclear in California. Respecting first party cases, the California
Supreme Court recently adopted a manifestation approach and held that the only carrier obligated to
indemnify the insured was the insurer whose policy was effective at the time damage was fiust
discovered. Prudential LMI Comm. Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674,648-700,798 P.2d 1230,
124647,274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 403-04 (1990) (hereinafter PrudentialLMI). PrudentialLMI concerned
which of two insurers would be obligated to indemnify the insured for progressive damage to an
apartment building which occurred during multiple first party policy periods. The court's decision
in PrudentialLMI resolved questions as to the reach of an earlier Fourth District Court of Appeals
decision in Home Insurance Company v. Landmark Insurance Company. (hereinafter Landmark11).
The Fourth District summarized the issue presented in Landmark II as follows:
In Home, the sole issue resolved was 'which of two fust party insurers is liable
for the loss from continuing property damage manifested during successive policy
periods.' Our holding was that the first insurer in that situation must pay the
entire claim. In contrast, here we are presented with a case in which several
predecessor insurers are sought to be held liable for progressive loss which
allegedly took place in some measure during each of their policy periods. This
court in Home expressly stated that the facts then before us did not allow
consideration of 'the interestingquestion whether it is possiblefor the insuredto
have a covered loss when the loss is not readily observableduring the periodof
the policy under which the insured seeks paymenL' Predictably, this interesting
question has materialized in the form of this case.
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effective after the date of manifestation of damages was not obligated to the policyholder. Because
of these circumstances, a question was presented as to whether Landmark 11 simply stood for the
proposition that an insurer was not obligated for a claim after the insured became aware of damage,
first party claims, the only insurer obligated was the insurer
or for the proposition that as respects all
whose policies were effective at the time the damages were manifest. As earlier noted, the California
Supreme Court held that the manifestation approach determines the date of loss as respects all fast
party policies. Whether the manifestation approach applies to third party policies is subject to
conflicting decisions. In California Union Insurance Company v. Landmark Insurance Company
(hereinafter Landmark 1), the Second District Court of Appeal adopted a continuous occurrence
approach. The court held that, with respect to continuous and progressively occurring damages over
more than one policy period, both the carrier on the risk at the time the damage was occurring and
the carrier on the risk at the time that the damage was discovered, were jointly and severally liable
for the damage. 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 478, 193 Cal. Rptr, 461,471 (1983). However, in Fireman's
Fund InsuranceCompany v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, the Fourth District Court of Appeal adopted
the manifestation approach as determinative of an insurer's claim for contribution brought against
another insurer. The court held that because the damage did not manifest during the policy period
of the insurer from whom contribution was sought, that insurer was not obligated for any portion of
the damages. 223 Cal. App. 3d 1621, 1627-28, 273 Cal. Rptr. 431, 433-34 (1990). The Fourth
District specifically declined to follow the approach of the Second District in LandmarkL See also
Hancock Laboratories, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 1985) (declining to
follow Landmark I because the Second District did not consider whether the damage process was
continuous or the result of a single event and because the facts presented in Hancock concerned
injuries arising from one injury producing event, the implantation of a contaminated heart valve,
where the date of loss was the date of implantation). Whether Fireman'sFund Insurance Company
v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company authorizes an insurer to deny any obligations to an insured
if the date of manifestation is not within the insurer's policy period is unclear. In Fireman'sFund,
the Fourth District was careful to note that the insured had already been fully compensated. 223 Cal.
App. 3d at 1628, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 434. It is unclear if a different result would be obtained were a
claim brought by an insured against two carriers. If there is no obligation to contribute to damages
as respects a contribution claim brought by an insurer, the other insurer could argue that as respects
the claim brought by an insured, the same rule applies. Because of tlese conflicting decisions, the
issue will have to be resolved at some point by the California Supreme Court. The parties in
Fireman's Fundhave not sought further review but the issue will undoubtedly be presented to the
court in another proceeding. The resolution of this issue is unclear but Fireman's Fundwould not
appear to be consistent with either prior California law or underwriting intent. Moreover, it is
doubtful that the California Supreme Court will be persuaded by its decision in PrudentialLML The
court expressly stated in Prudential LMI that it was not considering allocation in a toxic tort or
continuous exposure context. Prudential LMI Comm. Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 698,798
P.2d 1230, 1246,274 Cal. Rptr. 387,403 (1990). Previously, the California Supreme Court carefully
distinguished first party and third party coverage determination principles. As the court stated in
Garvey v. State FarmInsurance Company, "Liability and corresponding coverage under a third party
insurance policy must be carefully distinguished from the coverage analysis in a first party property
contract. Property insurance, unlike liability insurance, is unconcerned with establishing negligence
or otherwise assessing tort liability." 48 Cal. 3d 395, 406,770 P.2d 704, 710,257 Cal. Rptr. 292, 298
(1989). Moreover, first party policies clearly present a different undertaking by the insurer than third
party liability policies. As one commentator has stated, "[t]he all risk policy purports to provide
coverage for every physical loss, NO MATTER WHAT THE CAUSE, excepting only those causes
specifically excluded under the terms of the policy." RuDY, Concurrent Causation:Making Sense
of the All Risk Policy," Tort and Insurance Practice Section, ABA, THE ALLRISK POLICY: ITS
SPECIAL PROBLEMS, PER Ls, AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION, 77 (1986). Under an all risk policy,
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therefore, the insured has a much more favorable burden of roof, namely, whether a loss covered by
the policy was sustained during the period of the policy. The insured is not required to go further and
prove the exact nature of the accident or casualty which, in fact, occasioned his loss. See Keeton,
Insurance Law, § 5.2, at 270-72 (1971); RuDLOFF, Homeowners and Related Policies, California
InsuranceLaw & Practice, § 36.41 at 36 (1989). Last, to the extent that joint insurance organization
drafting history may be deemed relevant (some carriers participated in such drafting groups but
rejected the position taken by the group), it tends to reject the manifestation theory. American Home
Products v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company contains the most detailed citation to the Insurance
Services Office (hereinafter ISO) drafting history. In rejecting a manifestation approach, the court
noted the deposition testimony of members of the forms committee of the ISO's predecessor
organization, the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau. The court stated:
The CGL evolved out of the difficulties faced by courts and parties in dealing with
personal injuries and property damage sustained as a result of gradual processes. Prior to
1966, general liability policies covered [injury and damages] caused by accident .... The
word 'accident' suggested an intent to cover only sudden, unexpected, but identifiable
events. The courts were left in doubt as to whether, and to what extent, the standard policy
was meant to cover liability for injuries that resulted from gradual processes, rather than
from sudden events.
The insurance industry responded to the uncertainty created by the 'accident'
orientation by establishing a task force to draft what eventually became the CGL.... The
task force substituted the 'occurrence' approach now in the CGL... policies for the
'accident' approach, and it expressly provided that no occurrence included any injury or
damage that resulted, not only from an accident, but also from injurious exposure over an
extended period. This change adopted the result reached by courts that construed 'accident'
to include injuries resulting from long-term exposures.
The new CGL failed, however to resolve definitely the time injury should be found
to occur... The CGL, like its predecessor, requires only that injury take place during the
coverage period. But, since the injuries expressly covered under the CGL include those
resulting from long-term injurious exposure, the difficulty of determining time of injury was
certain to be even greater under the CGL than it had been under predecessor policies. The
insurance industry task force recognized this problem from the very outset of its labors, just
as courts had recognized by then that an injury could occur in scientific fact long before
it became manifest. Nevertheless, the task force refused to alter the standard policy
language to define precisely the time of injury; in the process, moreover, they refused to
adopt language thatwould have incorporatedinto the CGL either the manifestation or the
exposure theory.
Substantialevidence supports the view that the CGL draftsmen rejected the manifestation
theory as a limitation on coverage. One of the fist drafts, prepared by the Joint Drafting
Committee in 1960, 'would deem all injury to have occurred' at the time of first manifestation
of damage. That draft was sent back to the Drafting Committee by the higher level Joint Rating
Committee, and Mr. Schmalz [an active participant in the committee] testified without
contradiction that this remand was a rejection by the task force leadership of the manifestation
approach. The variouscommitteesrejected allotherdrafts thatincludeda manifestation concept,
they found the concept unaiceptablebecause, among other reasons, 'it would permit a carrier
to cancelfollowing the first notice of injury and leave the insured without coveragefor other
injuries emerging from the same exposure,' and because in many cases injuries sufficiently
serious to trigger coverage could occur prior to manifestation.
Rejection of the manifestation approach was thus implicit in the drafters [conduct]. [The insurer]
contends that the history of the CGL cannot be relied upon .... because material issues of fact
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approach tends to minimize coverage, a court might be influenced
to reject this approach." 6 Other courts, in determining the date
of occurrence, have held that the date of conduct giving rise to
claims, that is, the date of dumping, will constitute the date of
loss.t°7
Other courts have regarded the period during which actual
injury to the environment occurred as determinative of the date of
loss.1" 8 This approach is referred to as the "injury in fact"
theory.
Still another approach regards the date of loss as including the
entire period of time from the date of conduct giving rise to the

exist as to what the task force intended. But [the insurer] has failed to raise a material issue of
fact by offering evidence to contradict the view that the CGL drafters rejected the manifestation
approach.
American Home Products v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1500-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd 748 F.2d 760 (1984) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). It must be emphasized that a number
of insurers did not agree with the nonmanifestation approach taken by the Joint Forms Drafting
Committee. Thus, if such a position were revealed to insureds, then reliance on joint drafting history
would be unwarranted. In addition, as noted by many courts, the joint drafting history is either
inconclusive or irrelevant because it did not make up a part of the negotiation process between a
particular insured and insurer. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 823 n.9, 799 P.2d
1253, 1265 n.9, 274 Cal. Rptr. 820, 832 n.9 (1990).
106. See ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 764 F.2d 968, 973-974 (3rd Cir. 1985); Am,
Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1500-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 748
F.2d 760 (2nd Cir. 1984); Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases, S.F. Super Ct., Jud. Coordin. Proc. 1072
(Phase III) (slip op. May 29, 1987), Phase V (slip op. August 29, 1988).
107. See Wausau Ins. Co. v. Valspar Corp., 594 F. Supp. 269, 272-73 (N.D. 111.1984) (where
insured could not show dumping during policy period, coverage could not exist); Uniroyal, Inc. v.
Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1387-90 (E.D. N.Y. 1988) (coverage did not exist where
contamination did not occur during policy period because insured had shipped Agent Orange to
government for use in Viet Nam and had no control after delivery).
108. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212, 1223 (6th
Cir. 1980), affd on reh'g., 657 F.2d 814 (1981), cert.denied,455 U.S. 1009 (1982); Porter v. Amer.
Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,454 U.S. 1109 (1981) (date of loss
in bodily injury cases); U.S. v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 197 (W.D. Mo. 1986)
(date of actual damage to environment); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 677 F.
Supp. 342, 346 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (date of loss in property contamination cases).
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This approach is
contamination to the date of discovery."
approach.
occurrence"
as
a
"continuous
generally referred to
Date of loss determinations may also be affected by the
applicable statute of limitations. Under this view, if the statute of
limitations bars recovery against the insured for damage that arose
during a policy period in which the insured was covered, a date of
loss will not be found since the insured bears no legal liability for
damages during the policy period. 10 Thus, the statute of
limitations might play a part in determining which insurers are held
liable. However, in other cases, the statute of limitations is not
considered, on the basis that a showing of damage occurring during
the policy period is sufficient to trigger coverage.'
2. Expected or Intended?
Disputes have arisen whether coverage exists for clean-up and
related expenses on the basis that contamination is not occasioned
by an "occurrence" as defined in a CGL policy."' Insurers have
argued that pollution which occurs as the result of intentional
dumping or which was the result of operations in the regular course
of business over a period of time poses a foreseeable risk of
contamination. Under this argument, an occurrence would not be

109. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1046-47 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. den., 455 U.S. 1007, reh'g. den., Ribotsky v. U.S., 456 U.S. 951 (1982) (trigger for
bodily damage). ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 973 (3rd Cir. 1985);
Continental Ins. Co. v. N.E. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 811 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd on
other grounds, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cel-O Corp., 662 F.
Supp. 71, 76 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Dayton Ind. Sch. Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1402,
1403 (W.D. Tex. 1988), vacated, 896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1989); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Thomas
Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1153-54 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Ind. Petrochem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp. 1334, 1346, 1359 (D.D.C. 1986) (injury in fact theory); Idaho v. Bunker
Hill Co., 647 F. Supp. 1064, 1071 (Id. 1986); Asbestos Ins. Cov. Cases, S.F. Super. Ct., Jud.
Coordin. Proc. 1072 (Phase V) (slip op. August 29, 1988); Indus. Steel Container Co. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 399 N.W.2d 156, 159-160 (Minn. 1987); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents
and Chemicals Co., 17 Oh. App. 3d 127,477 N.E.2d 1227, 1233 (1984); Techalloy Co. v. Reliance
Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 1, 9-11,487 A.2d 820, 823-26 (1984) (trigger for property contamination).
110. Idaho v. Bunker Hill, 647 F. Supp. 1064, 1070 (D. Idaho 1986).
111. See, e.g., Garriott v. Southern Aviation Ins., 221 Cal. App. 3d 783, 796-97, 270 Cal. Rptr.
678, 686 (1990).
112. Some EIL policy forms do not include the term "occurrence" and thus, if an insured
purchased such coverage, this concern would be eliminated.
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present for such claims because the loss to the insured would be
"expected or intended." Judicial decisions conflict on this
13

issue. 1

E. Is The Pollution Exclusion Applicable?
Perhaps the most frequently litigated exclusion concerns the
meaning of the so-called pollution exclusion clause.tn 4 This
clause excludes coverage for damages caused by a wide variety of

113. Am. Cas. Co. v. Minn. Farm Bureau Servs. Co., 270 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1959)
(emission in regular course of business were not accident); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
587 F.Supp. 1549, 1553 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (repeated, possibly illegal, dumping not accident). See
also, Alcolac, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1541, 1544-45 (D.Md. 1989)
(punitive damage award demonstrated occurrence not present). Where the insured has knowledge of
contamination prior to the inception of policy, courts have held an occurrence is not present. Tp. of
Gloucester v. Maryland Cas. Co., 668 F. Supp. 394, 402-03 (D. NJ. 1987); U.S. v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 178-83 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (no occurrence after date government
implemented clean-up proceedings); Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Great Am. Surplus Ins. Co.,
199 Cal. App. 3d 791, 801-02, 245 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49-50 (1988). But see City of Kimball v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 190 Neb. 152, 154-62,206 N.W.2d 632, 634-41 (1973) (contamination result
of leakage in sewage lagoon "accident" where insured's inspection had not revealed holes). See
generally City of Aurora v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 905, 906-07 (10th Cir. 1964) (backup of sewage not "'accident" where insured aware of problem in sewage system); City of Carter Lake
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1979); Vyn v. Northwest Cas. Co., 47
Cal. 2d 89, 94, 301 P.2d 869, 872 (1956) (no coverage for subsidence problem known to exist prior
to inception of policy); Cametal Corp. v. Nat'l Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 831,
835-36, 11 Cal. Rptr. 280, 283 (1961) (no coverage for accident known to have occurred prior to
inception); Millard Warehouse, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 204 Neb. 518,530-33,283 N.W.2d 56,
63-64 (1979) (warehouse damaged by flooding not unexpected where prior to construction expert
indicated flooding possibility). The fact that the insured did not have control of, or may not have
owned, the entity allegedly responsible for the contamination at the time the insurance policies were
in effect has also been found not to be an occurrence under such policy. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home
Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1382-90 (E.D. N.Y. 1988) (insured did not control); Idaho v. Bunker
Hill Co., 647 F. Supp. 1064, 1077 (D. Idaho 1986) (at time policies were in effect, insured did not
own polluting entity and did not acquire until after policies expired).
114. This insurance does not apply:
(f)
[T bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal,
release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids
or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon
land the atmosphere or any water course or body of water, but this exclusion does
not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.
ISO form GL 00 02 (1-73).
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polluting activities, except those which are sudden and
accidental." 5 Insureds who attempt to establish that costs
imposed on them by a governmental entity are covered, but who
have policies containing the pollution'- exclusion, have been
confronted with addressing this controversy about the meaning of
the exclusion.
A number of courts have held that the exception to the pollution
exclusion is merely a restatement of the definition given to the
term "occurrence,"
and that the word "sudden" means
"unintended. ' '1 1 6 Under, this view, coverage exists if the insured

115. For a general discussion of the drafting process and various versions of the pollution
exclusion, see Averback, Comparing The OldAnd The New PollutionExclusion Clausesin General
LiabilityInsurancePolicies: New Language-Same Results?, 14 B.C. ENvTL. Are. L.R. 601 (1987).
Some newer polices include what is referred to as the "absolute" pollution exclusion. This exclusion
provides typically:
This insurance does not apply to:
(1) [B]odily injury, property damage or injury or damage of any nature or any
kind to persons or property arising out of the actual, alleged threatened emission,
discharge, dispersal, seepage, release or escape of pollutants; (2) any loss, cost or
expense incurred as a result of clean-up of pollutants; (3) the investigation,
settlement or defense of any claim, suit or proceeding against the insured,
including any payments, costs or expenses as described in (1) and (2) above.
Fid., Cas. & Sur. Bulletins, Public Liability, § Aa-7 (1990). Courts have upheld this exclusion. Hydro
Systems, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 700, 702 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Alcolac, Inc. v. Ca.
Union Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1546, 1549 (D. Md. 1989); Guilford Industs. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
688 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Me. 1988).
116. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1156-57 (W.D. Mich.
1988); New Castle County v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (D. Del. 1987);
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152,203-04 (W.D. Mo. 1986); Nat'l Grange
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 650 F. Supp. 1404, 1410-12 (S.D. N.Y. 1986); City of
Northglenn v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 217,222 (D. Colo. 1986); Claussen v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686, 690 (1989); Kipin Indus., Inc. v. Am. Universal Ins. Co.,
41 Oh. App. 3d 228,231-32,535 N.E.2d 334,338-39 (1987); C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. Am. Home
Ins. Co., 640 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1981); Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Ins. Co.,
650 F. Supp. 1404, 1411 (S.D. N.Y. 1986); Sellers v. Seligman, 463 So. 2d 697, 702 (La. App.
1985); Shapiro v. Pub. Servs. Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App. 648, 650-53, 477 N.E.2d 146, 149-50
(1985); Jonesville Prods., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 156 Mich. App. 508, 512-513, 402
N.W.2d 46, 48 (1986); Jackson Tp. v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 186 NJ.Super. 156, 165, 451
A.2d 990,994 (1982); CPS Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 NJ. Super. 558,489 A.2d 1265,
1270 (NJ. 1984), reversed 489 A.2d 886 (1984); Reliance Ins. Co. of Illinois v. Martin, 126 IlL.
App.
3d 94,97-98,467 N.E.2d 287 (1984); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chem. Co., 17
Oh. App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1234-1235 (1984); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake
Union, 34 Wash.App. 708, 714-715, 664 P.2d 1262, 1266 (Wash. 1983); Lansco, Inc. v. Dept. of
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does not intend to cause damage. Other courts have reasoned that
the word "sudden" has a temporal connotation, and if pollution is
shown to have occurred over a period of time, damages are not
covered.117 Some courts have refused to apply the exception in
cases where the insured was not an active polluter but was merely
a generator of wastes shipped to a site by a third party." 8

Envtl. Protection, 138 NJ.Super. 275, 282, 350 A.2d 520, 524 (1975), aft'd, 145 NJ. Super. 433,
435, 368 A.2d 363, 364 (1976). See also Benedictine Sisters v. St. Paul Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 815
F.2d 1209, 1211 (8th Cir. 1987) (look to insured's intent at time of discharge).
117. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 693 F. Supp. 617, 620-21 (N.D. Tenn.
1988), aft'd,875 F.2d 868 (1989); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31, 34-35
(6th Cir. 1988); Great Lakes Container Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 33-34 (Ist
Cir. 1984); Hayes v. Maryland Cas. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513, 1515 (N.D. Fla. 1988); Fireman's Fund
Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317, 1325 (E.D. Mich. 1988); Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.
v. Neville Chem. Co., 650 F. Supp. 929, 933 (W.D. Pa. 1987); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549, 1553-54 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 676 F.
Supp. 1571, 1578 (S.D. Ga. 1987), vacated and certified question sent to Georgia Supreme Court,
865 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1987), 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686, 690 (Ga. 1989) (Georgia Supreme
Court rejected district court determination); Barmet of Indiana, Inc. v. Security Ins. Group, 425
N.E.2d 201,203 (Ind. App. 1981); Waste Management of the Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315
N.C. 688, 698-701, 340 S.E.2d 374, 389 (1986); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. 136,
13941,711 P.2d 212, 213-14 (1985); Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 1, 12-15,
487 A.2d 820, 826-27 (1984). Currently, resolution of this issue is unclear in California. In one trial
court decision, the word "sudden" in a similarly worded exclusion was held to have a temporal
connotation. Shell Oil Co. v. Ace. & Cas. Co. of Winterthur (Phase 1), No. 278953, slip. op. at 36-43
(San Mateo Sup. Ct. July 28, 1989).
118. City of Northglenn v. Chevron U.S.A., 634 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D. Colo. 1986); Molton,
Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95, 99 (Ala. 1977); U.S. Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 384-88, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1075-76
(1989); Autotronic Systems, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 89 A.D.2d 401,403, 456 N.Y.S.2d 504,
506 (1982); Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Misc. 2d 814, 818, 427 N.Y.S.2d 171, 174
(1980); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, 34 Wash. App. 708, 714-15, 664 P.2d 1257,
1265-66 (1983). See also Am. Universal Ins. Co. v. Whitewood Custom Treaters, Inc., 707 F. Supp.
1140, 1146 (D.S.D. 1989) (dicta stating rule); Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1161
(W.D. Mich. 1988); Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541,
1548-49 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. 136, 711 P.2d 212, 214
(1985). But see Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317, 1322-25 (E.D.
Mich. 1988) (rejecting application of distinction); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co.,
693 F. Supp. 617, 621 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (only lawyer's ingenuity could make term "sudden,"
ambiguous); Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423, 1429-30 (D. Kan.
1987) (common understanding of 'sudden" not consistent with event occurring gradually over period
of time).
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F. Is The PremisesAlienated Exclusion Applicable?
The premises alienated exclusion119 was designed to exclude

coverage for damage to property sold by the insured." Where
contamination has been found on property sold by the insured, the
insurer may assert the premises alienated exclusion as a basis for
the lack of coverage."'
G. Is The Owned Property Exclusion Applicable?
Generally, a liability policy does not cover damages that the
insured sustains to the insured's own property. Thus, where the
damage is confined only to property owned by the insured,
coverage may not exist. Some courts have stated that the owned
property exclusion is evidence of this intent.1
If the
contaminated property was owned by the insured, the insured may
wish to consider the application of first party coverage to a claim
for property damage.

119. The premises alienated exclusion provides: "[This insurance does not apply] (1)
to property
damage to premises alienated by the named insured arising out of such premises or any part thereof."
ISO form GL 02 02 (ed. 1-73).
120. Taylor-Morley-Simon, Inc. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 645 F. Supp. 596,598-600 (E.D. Mo.
1986) (does not exclude damage for personal injury or for property damage to other premises which
arise out of alienated premises); Wilmington Island Constr. Co. v. Cincinnatti Ins. Co., 179 Ga. App.
477, 347 S.E.2d 308, 309-10 (1986) (no coverage for property damage occuring after insured sold
premises to injured party).
121. See Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 927, 930 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd,
865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir. 1989) (exclusion clear and applies to property sold by insured); Diamond
Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 231 NJ. Super. 1, 11-15, 554 A.2d 1342, 1347
(1989) (holding exclusion applies to preclude coverage for claims of contamination to insured's
property); Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCarty's Inc., No. 83-1441 slip op. (D. Idaho July 22, 1988)
(quoted in Mealy's Lit. Reports) (where contamination to other property, exclusion inapplicable).
122. See Patrick v. Head of Lakes Coop. Elec. Ass'n, 98 Wis. 2d 66, 70, 295 N.W.2d 205, 208
(1980) (purpose of exclusion to avoid coverage for claims which should be covered under different
lines of insurance, that is, products or fi-st-party coverage); Aerojet General Corp. v. Superior Court,
211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 237-38, 258 Cal. Rptr. 684, 685-86 (1989); Summit Assocs., Inc. v. Liberty
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 229 NJ. 56, 66, 550 A.2d 1235, 1239-40 (1988); BroadwelU Realty Servs., Inc.
v. Fidel. & Cas. Co., 218 NJ.Super. 516, 528-29, 528 A.2d 76, 82 (1988).
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H. Is The Products Exclusion Applicable?
CGL policies generally exclude coverage for damage to the
insured's work or products." 3 Insurers may contend coverage is
excluded because waste is allegedly a product of the insured's
business operations. A number of courts have rejected this
contention.124
I. Is The Completed Operations Hazard Exclusion Applicable?
Certain CGL policies include what is called "broad form"
coverage. Two different versions of this coverage part have been
drafted, those including completed operations and those excluding
liability for completed operations. Basically, completed operations
coverage is designed to cover tort liabilities that arise after the
insured completes operations at a particular location. This coverage
is intended to provide the same protection to construction and
service companies that products liability coverage provides to
companies dealing in goods: Protection against tort liability arising

123. These policies typically do not apply:
(k) to property damage to
(1) property owned or occupied by or rented to the insured;
(2) property used by the insured;
(3) property in the care, custody, or control of the insured or as to
which the insured is exercising physical control...
(m) to loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or
destroyed resulting from ...
(2) the failure of the named insured's products or work performed by or on behalf
of the named insured to meet the level of performance, quality, fitness, or
durability warranted or represented by the named insured.
(n) to property damage to the named insured's products arising out of such
products-or any part of such products.
(o) to property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the named insured
arising out of the work or any portion thereof or out of materials, parts or
equipment furnished in connection therewith.
ISO form GL 00 02 (Ed. 1-73).
124. Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chem. Co., 17 Oh. App. 3d'127, 477 N.E.2d
1227, 1235-36 (1984). See Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384, 392-94 (D. Md. 1978)
(products coverage did not apply to damage caused by airborne emissions since pollutants were not
a product).
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from the services, materials, or structures which are placed in the
marketplace. 25 The most common example is that of a general
contractor who completes work on a structure, and then, after the
general contractor's operations have been completed, an injury
occurs by reason of defective work.
In the pollution coverage context, if contamination arises after
the insured completes operations at a location the completed
operations exclusion may be asserted by the insurer. Generally,
unless the contamination arose from the nature of the insured's
product which was offered for sale, this exclusion has been held
inapplicable.126

V. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Response To Reservation Of Rights
In California, the supreme court has held that a reservation of
rights may be accomplished by an "adequate" reservation of
rights.127 Some insureds have successfully maintained that in
order to be valid, a reservation of rights must be bilateral. 28
Some question exists whether this contention will be upheld.'29
Where the insurer reserves the right to seek reimbursement of
defense costs, some insureds have maintained that, since the
insurer's obligation under most policies is to defend all potentially
covered claims whether groundless, false or fraudulent, an insurer

125. See CALiF. INs. LAW & PR.Ac, § 47.06 at 47-22 to 47-25 (1989); Fid., Cas. & Sur.
Bulletins, Public Liability § Epb 7-9 (8/82); id. §§ Pr, Pre (2/89); Annot., 58 A.LR.3D 12 (1974).
126. See Kipin Industries, Inc. v. American Universal Ins. Co., 41 Ohio App. 3d 228,535 N.E.2d
334, 338 (1987); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chem. Co., Inc. 17 Ohio App. 3d
127, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1235-37 (1984).
127. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 279, 419 P.2d 168, 178, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 114
(1966).
128. See supra note 68.
129. Recently, an insurer was held to be entitled to settle a case over the objection of the insured
and still seek reimbursement. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Imperial Contracting Co., 212 &al. App. 3d 712,
714-22, 260 Cal. Rptr. 797, 803 (1989). Imperial Contracting might support an argument that a
defense could be furnished pursuant to a unilateral reservation of rights over the objection of the
insured. See also Johansen v. Calif. State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 18, 538 P.2d
744, 750, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288, 294 (1975).
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may not reserve the right to seek reimbursement of defense

costs. 3 ° The insurers can be expected to argue that the
groundless, false or fraudulent clause only applies to claims that

might be potentially covered; thus, a reservation of right to seek
reimbursement of defense costs does not contravene any right
enjoyed under the insurance policy. Judicial decisions conflict on

this issue."
B. Waiver Of Coverage Defenses
The issuance of a reservation of rights letter generally limits the
insurer to those coverage defenses stated in the original letter.'

130. The majority view appears to be that a reservation of right to seek reimbursement need not
be by bilateral agreement, but merely by communication of the insurer's intent to reserve the right
to seek reimbursement. See Walbrook Ins. Co. v. Goshgarian & Goshgarian, 726 F. Supp. 777, 78283 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Omaha Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cardon Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 502,504-05 (N.D. Cal.
1988). The minority view is that a reservation of rights on this ground must be pursuant to a bilateral
agreement. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Alan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 702,708-10,272 Cal. Rptr. 65,69-70 (1990).
131. See generally, 7C APPELMAN, INs. LAw & PRAc., § 4694, at 336 (1979), at 55 (1990
Supp.) See also St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 804 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1987)
(applying California law) (an understanding or expression of intent to reserve right is required to
preserve right to seek reimbursement of defense costs); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 187 Cal. App.
3d 169, 203-04, 231 Cal. Rptr. 791, 809-10 (1986) (where letter did not reserve right to seek
reimbursement, insurer could not seek reimbursement); Omaha Indem. Co. v. Cardon, 687 F. Supp.
502, 504-05 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (reservation of rights letter which indicated intent to seek
reimbursement sufficient to preserve right); Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Arciero & Sons, 146 Cal.
App. 3d 1027, 194 Cal. Rptr. 688, (1983) (right to seek reimbursement of defense costs upheld
without question of reservation of right); Safeco Title Ins. Co. v. Moskopoulos, 116 Cal. App. 3d
658, 172 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1981). Compare idwith Sneed v. Concord Ins. Co., 98 N.J. Super. 306,237
A.2d 289, 293 (1967) (reservation of rights letter stating intent to seek reimbursement insufficient)
132. A statement of the confusion surrounding the use of terms waiver and estoppel has been
succinctly stated by one court:
As pointed out by Professor Langmaid ... insurance cases have used the terms
waiver and estoppel with less distinction than one would expect. He quotes
Judge Cuthbert Pound ... as follows:
The tendency on the part of the courts to treat insurance contracts as
standing in a class by themselves and to protect against forfeitures
invoked in defense of honest claims has led to much subtlety. As
Professor Woodruff says "What do they know about the law of the
insurance contract who only the law of contract know?...
While estoppel is a slippery enough term under ordinary circumstances, being
frequently employed indifferently to cover estoppel by misrepresentation and
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Thus, if an insurer fails to state certain grounds as possible bases
for the lack of coverage, and undertakes the defense or causes the
insured to detrimentally rely on the insurer, a waiver of such
grounds may be found. 133 Consequently, the reservation of rights
letter should be reviewed carefully to determine what bases have
been asserted and which possible grounds have not been asserted.

C. Entry Into Defense Funding Agreement
In entering into a defense funding agreement, the insured should
consider whether entry into this type of agreement will enable the
insured to obtain a prompt defense. Thus, the insured will want to
consider whether the insurer's demands that the insured participate

promissory estoppel, it is found to the insurance cases to take on an even more
enlarged meaning and to be inextricably interwoven with waiver. The two terms
are frequently used synonymously.
Grantham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 126 Cal. App. 2d. Supp. 855, 858-59, 272 P.2d 959,
961 (1954) (citations omitted). Moreover, another court has stated:
To find equitable estoppel, one must show: (1) (t]hat the person to be estopped had
knowledge of the true facts; (2) that action on his part intended or reasonably interpreted
as intended to be acted upon by the party asserting the estoppel; (3) that the one asserting
the estoppel was ignorant of the true facts; and (4) that there was detrimental reliance on
the estopped person's conduct.
Miller v. Elite Insurance Company, 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 754, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322, 330 (1980).
Accord, Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 18 Cal. 2d 256, 264-265, 115 P.2d 450, 454-55
(1941); Rheem Mfg. Co. v. United States, 57 Cal. 2d 621, 626,371 P.2d 578,583,21 Cal. Rptr. 802,
805 (1962). Where detrimental reliance has not been demonstrated, estoppel or waiver cannot be
found. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Spartan Realty International, Inc., 196 Cal. App. 3d 1320,
1326-28,242 Cal. Rptr. 462, 465-66 (1987) (waiver or estoppel not present because no detrimental
reliance and excess insurer's obligations had not been called into play).
133. See, e.g., Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 755, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322, 331
(1980). See also Intel Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1179-80 (N.D. Cal.
1988); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 195, 355 N.E.2d 24,29 (1976). An insurer may
also be found to have waived the right to seek reimbursement of defense costs if such is not stated
in the reservation of rights letter. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Ralee Engineering Co., 804 F.2d
520, 522 (9th Cir. 1986); Johansen v. California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance
Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 19,538 P.2d 744, 750, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288,294 (1975) (reservation of right to
seek reimbursement of settlement amounts); but cf. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Imperial Contracting Co.,
212 Cal. App. 3d 712, 721-22, 260 Cal. Rptr. 797, 804 (1989) (insurer who effected settlement under
reservation of right over insured's objection and brought claim for reimbursement was subject to
defense by insured that no liability or damages exist).
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by paying a share of defense costs will enable the majority of the
costs to be paid. If payments are made under these circumstances,
the funding agreement should reserve the right to seek
reimbursement in the event any party is found to be not obligated
to pay defense costs. 1" If an agreement between the insured and
insurers cannot be obtained and a potential for coverage has been
clearly demonstrated or is clearly absent, declaratory relief actions
may be instituted. Both insurers and insureds have attempted to
resolve these issues by motions for summary adjudication.
D. Appointment Of Counsel
Because of the insurer's potential objections to coverage,
particular attention should be devoted to selecting counsel who is
both competent and a specialist in environmental matters. Because
of the complexity of environmental coverage issues, in cases of
substantial magnitude, the insured should also consider appointing
counsel who specializes in environmental matters. If counsel has
been designated pursuant to agreement, or has been provided by the
insurer, the insured may be required to retain separate counsel to
address coverage issues on its behalf.
E. Interpretation Of Policy Provisions
An initial question arises as to the presumptions to be applied
when interpreting ambiguous insurance policy provisions. As a
general rule, insurance policies are referred to as contracts of
adhesion and are interpreted against the insurer and in favor of
coverage.135 Insurers often contend that this presumption is
inapplicable if an insured is sophisticated and employs specialized
brokers or insurance consultants, or if the insured participates in the

134. This position would seem to preserve all parties' rights and comports with those decisions
holding the right to seek reimbursement must be by bilateral agreement. See supra note 130.
135. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 270, 419 P.2d 168, 171-'54 Cal. Rptr. 104,
107 (1966).
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drafting of insurance policy provisions."3 6 Insureds respond that
their sophistication or size is no reason to afford them less
coverage than would otherwise be provided.
The standardization of policy provisions may be urged as a
basis to hold insurers to the views expressed by joint insurer
drafting organizations such as the Insurance Services Office
(hereinafter ISO). It should be emphasized that the ISO drafted
forms for numerous types of coverage, that acceptance of such
forms was voluntary, and the records kept by this organization are
extremely voluminous.
Insurers can be expected to argue that absent a showing of
actual participation in drafting, ISO documents are irrelevant
because of their merely advisory function. Insureds contend that
evidence of the intent of the drafters when formulating provisions
identical to those contained in a particular insurer's policy may be
relevant in determining the intent of the provision contained in the
insurance policy. Some trial courts, faced with these voluminous
ISO materials, have simply referred to them as

"inconclusive."'

137

F. Carriers Without Pollution Exclusions
Insurance policies issued prior to the early 1970s may not
include a pollution exclusion. If contamination-producing events

136. In AIU, the California Supreme Court rejected the insurer's assertions that, absent evidence
that the insured did negotiate any policy terms, the policy should be interpreted in view of normal
interpretational rules, notwithstanding the insured's unquestioned sophistication and equal bargaining
power. AIU v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 823, n.9, 799 P.2d 1253, 1265, n.9, 274 Cal. Rptr.
820, 832, n.9 (1990). Furthermore, the court held that absent evidence that the parties intended
specialized meaning to apply, the "popular and ordinary" meaning of the terms at issue would apply.
Id. at 822-23, 799 P.2d at 1264-65,274 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Home Ins.
Co., 714 F.2d 4, 9 n.2 (2nd Cir. 1983); Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exch., 36 Cal.3d 426, 438, 682 P.2d
1100, 1105-06,204 Cal. Rptr. 435, 440-41 (1984); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 182
Cal. App. 3d 462, 467, 227 Cal. Rptr. 203, 206 (1986); Town of Epping v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 444 A.2d 496, 499 (N.H. 1982); Sturgis Nat'l Bank v. Maryland Cas. Co., 252 Mich. 426,
233 N.W. 367, 369 (1930).
137. See e.g. Asbestos Ins. Coy. Cases, Jud. Coordin. Proc. 1072 (Phase IV), slip op. at 33-40
(S.F. Super. Ct. May 29, 1990); Purex Industries, Eic. v. Leslie Walpole Proctor, No. 446 935 (L.A.
Super. Ct.) (op. on vacating prior summary adjudication); Protective Nat'l v. Union Oil Co., (no. C
514 463) (LA. Super. Ct.) (order denying motion for reconsideration).
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occurred prior to the introduction of the pollution exclusion, these
policies may ultimately cover environmental claims in the absence
of other coverage defenses. 3 ' Some courts have reasoned that if
events resulting in damage start during one policy period, the
insurer of this policy is liable for all damage ultimately sustained
as the result of this process, even if the damage is not finalized
until after the expiration of the insurance policy.139 As such, if
the insured acted to cause contamination during a policy that
subsequently expired, coverage may be found to exist under that
policy. Consequently, an insured may wish to determine whether
contamination-producing events occurred in periods when insurance
policies did not have pollution exclusions.
G. Is Damage During The Policy Period Necessary?
As noted above, insurers may contend that, in the absence of
evidence of conduct by the insured and contamination occurring
during the policy period, the insurer's duties to defend and
indemnify cannot arise."' Therefore, the insured should make
every effort to determine which conduct occurred during a
particular policy period when making demands against insurers.

138. This is under the principle of joint and several liability. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna
Broadcasting Co., 727 F. Supp. 169,174 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (policies without pollution exclusion jointly
and severally liable for entirety of contamination related expenses). Some courts have held that
holding an insurer responsible for damages which occurred outside the insurer's policy period is
inconsistent with the insuring agreement which conditions payment, through the definition of property
damage, on damage occurring within the policy period. See Ins. Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D.Mich. 1978), aff'd in part, 633 F.2d 1212, 1224-25 (6th Cir.
1980) (liability is individual and proportionate for that damage demonstrated to have occurred during
policy period), modified, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1009 (1981); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.
v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71,75-76 (E.D.Mich. 1987) (same); Gruol Construction v. Ins. Co.
of North America, I I Wash.App. 632, 524 P.2d 427, 430-31 (1974) (insurer not liable for damage
proven to have occurred in other policy periods).
139. See, e.g. Sylla v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 895, 900-01, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 38, 40 (1976); Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 831, 24 Cal. Rptr.
44, 46 (1962).
140. Wausau Ins. Co. v. Valspar Corp., 594 F. Supp. 269, 272 (N.D. III. 1988); Uniroyal, Inc.
v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1387-90 (E.D. N.Y. 1988).
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H. Number Of Occurrences
If aggregate provisions are not included, most CGL policies
determine the limits available by the number of occurrences."'
Insurance policies typically provide that continuous exposure to
ongoing or similar conditions shall constitute one occurrence. Thus,
if more than one occurrence is present, more than one set of limits
may be available. However, CGL policies generally provide that
damages arising out of continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same conditions shall be considered as arising out
1 42
of one occurrence.
Dumping of contaminants over a period of time presents an
issue as to the number of occurrences represented by such conduct.
Where contamination is the result of a single instantaneous event,
courts have little difficulty concluding that this event constitutes a
single occurrence. In view of the occurrence definition,
contamination caused by repeated conditions over a period of time
may also be argued to constitute only a single occurrence.
However, where contamination is the result of business practices
over a period of time, or shipments on various dates, and a
combination of other events, an insured may wish to contend
multiple occurrences are present because doing so may increase the

141.The CGL policy typically provides:

mhe total liability of the company for all damages because of all property
damages sustained by one or more persons or organizations as the result of any
one occurrence shall not exceed the limit of property damage liability stated in
the declarations as applicable to each occurrence.

ISO form GL 00 02 (1-73).
142. The CGL language provides:
[Flor the purpose of determining the limit of the company's liability, all bodily
injury and property damage arising out of continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same general conditions shall be considered as arising out of one
occurrence.
ISO form GL 00 02 (1-73).

819

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
policy limits applicable to the claim.143 Contentions regarding the
number of occurrences may have the consequence of requiring
multiple payments under primary insurance policies before excess
insurance is called into play. The insured may want to establish a
position on what constitutes the date of loss, since taking a position
would have the consequence of specifying the involved insurers in
the coverage dispute.
I. Stacking Of Policy Limits
Closely allied to determining the number of occurrences, the
issue of computing policy limits when an insurer issues policies in
effect for a multiple year period; involves resolving whether the
limits are computed on the basis of number of years of coverage,
or only on the basis of the number of occurrences presented.'"
Obviously, it is in the insurer's best interest to contend that only a
single policy limit is applicable.
J. Applicability Of PersonalInjury Or Broad Form Coverage
Another possible argument for coverage can be made if the
insurance policy contains what is referred as "broad form" or
"personal injury ' 145 coverage parts. This coverage provision may

143. See generally American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F.Supp. 1485,
1501-03 (S.D. N.Y. 1983), affrd, 748 F.2d 760 (2nd Cir. 1984) (court held intent of ISO drafters was
not to follow manifestation approach and therefore possible where damage occurred in multiple policy
periods all periods would be involved); Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Levelor Lorentzen, Inc., 57
U.S.L.W. 2270, 1988 WL 112142 (D.N.J. 1988) (rejected application to property damage claims).
144. See generally Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases, Jud. Coordin. Proc., 1072 (Phase IV). slip op.
at 21-22 (S.F. Super. Ct. Aug 28, 1988). Compare Am. Home Prods. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565
F. Supp. 1485, 1510-11 (1983) (holding ISO CGL underwriters intbnt was to permit stacking where
injury occurred in multiple periods) and Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. o? N. Am, 667 F.2d 1034, 1049
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (only one policy could apply per claim) with Chicago Ins. Co. v. Pac. Indem. Co.,
566 F. Supp. 954, 956 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (where single injury, imits would not be stacked).
145. The term "personal injury" is a term of art, and has a specialized meaning defined by the
insurance policy which is different than the term "[B]odily injury." This term is specified in the
Broad Form General Liability Endorsement. The insuring agreement section provides: "The company
will pay on behalf of the Insuredall sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages because of personal injury or advertising injury to which this insurance applies." ISO
form GL 04 04 (5-81) A typical provision defining "personal injury" states that:
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be potentially applicable when damages are claimed on the basis
of trespass, or where contamination interferes with the right of
occupancy of premises. One major distinction between "personal
injury" and the standard liability provision covering damages
because of property damage or bodily injury is that damages need
not be caused by an "occurrence."
In addition, some insureds
have maintained that the policy exclusions for pollution contained
in the general liability coverage provision do not apply to the
provision for personal injury coverage. However, a number of
courts have rejected this contention."
K Settlement Of Environmental Claims
Generally, the longer that environmental proceedings are drawn
out and the more that clean-up measures are delayed, the more
expensive clean-up measures may become. Because of these
factors, the business should consider the feasibility of essentially
fixing the loss, by agreeing to fund the clean-up at a specified
figure or percentage of projected exposure and then litigating the
coverage issues at a subsequent date.
The extent to which the business may be ultimately liable, either
because of uncertainties as to liability or ultimate clean-up cost,
may make this type of funding agreement impossible. Under such
circumstances, some insureds have contended that ongoing
declaratory relief proceedings should be stayed. Insureds have also
personal injury means injury which arises out of one or more of the following offenses
committed in the conduct of the named insured's business:
(a) false arrest, detention or imprisonment, or malicious prosecution;
(b) the publication or utterance of a libel or slander or of other defamatory or
disparaging material, or a publication or utterance in violation of an individual's right
of privacy, except publications or utterances in the course of or related to advertising,
broadcasting or telecasting activities conducted by or on behalf of the named insured;
(c) wrongful entry or eviction, or other invasion of the right of private occupancy
Id. In contrast the definition of "'bodily injury" states that: "'bodilyinjury means bodily injury,
sickness or disease sustained by any person which occurs during the policy period, including death
at any time resulting therefrom." Id.
146. See American Universal Ins. Co. v. Whitewood Custom Theaters, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1140,
1147-48 (D.$.D. 1989); Jones v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 172 Mich. App. 24,431 N.W.2d 242,
244-45 (1988).
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contended that a declaratory relief action should be stayed if
continuing discovery in the proceeding might establish facts that
give rise to further liability on the part of the governmental entities.
Parties who favor disclosure can be expected to argue for
protective limitations on information rather than outright stays of
declaratory relief proceedings, particularly when an insurer is asked
to defend during the pendency of a stay and is thereby precluded
from obtaining a resolution of the coverage controversy. Under
these circumstances, some insureds have been asked to absorb the
defense costs during this interim period, or have caused insurers to
bear such costs without the ability to litigate whether the claim is
in fact excluded from coverage. Other insureds have worked out
a new funding agreement to cover responsibilities for fees during
the stay period.
Insureds have agreed to accept payment of either all or a portion
of policy limits on a loan receipt147 or a "buy-back" of the
insurer's responsibilities. Factors considered when reaching this
agreement include the likelihood of other claims, the presence of
aggregate limits, and the probability of successfully obtaining
coverage under the policy. Where a loan receipt agreement is
reached, the insured will generally still preserve claims against
nonparticipating insurers. Where coverage disputes exist and the
insurer has a uniform position on issues that relate to all
environmental claims,14 an insurer may be able to a make a
settlement without compromising its position.
VI. CURRENT PROSPECTS FOR DisPuTE RESOLUTION

Because of the numerous issues arising over coverage for
environmental claims, litigation of these issues is likely to be costly
147. Under a loan receipt agreement, an insurer will typically loan the insured needed funds. The
necessity for such an agreement may arise when certain insurers refuse to participate in a defense or
funding of a settlement of clean-up actions. The agreement can provide that the insurer will
participate in the prosecution of an action against other insurers, or payment of the funds loaned will
occur out of proceeds of actions brought against nonparticipating insurers.
148. For example, an insurer may have a position as to date of occurrence or whether coverago

exists for clean-up claims. In such instances, an insurer may not be willing to participate in any
settlement because any payment made may be conflicting with such position.
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and complex, involving multiple parties, voluminous documents,
numerous witnesses, and complicated legal issues for resolution. As
this Article has discussed, many of the issues await resolution by
the courts, and a definite prediction as to whether coverage exists
for a particular contamination caused injury often cannot be made.
Because many of the coverage issues are likely to involve factual
issues regarding the cause, nature, and extent of contamination and
the mechanism which caused damages, coverage litigation will
likely involve a repetition of the issues which allegedly rendered
the insured liable for contamination-related injury, as well as new
litigation into the intent of the parties as expressed in the insurance
policies.
Discovery proceedings are likely to be time-consuming and
expensive because of the numerous parties and voluminous
documents involved. It is probable that insurers will have offices
with potentially involved personnel in many locations within the
United States as well as abroad, and thus discovery proceedings
will involve many depositions in many jurisdictions, with
associated travel expenses. Both the insured and the insurer can be
expected to file numerous motions on discovery issues, as well as
so called "dispositive motions" on issues as to whether a duty to
defend exists, whether the claim is the result of an "occurrence,"
and whether the claims are foreclosed by various exclusions,
particularly the pollution exclusion.
Because of the complexity of the legal issues and the likelihood
that factual issues remain to be decided by the trier of fact, trial
proceedings are also likely to be time-consuming and expensive.
Trial proceedings present the parties with substantial uncertainties
because of possible jury confusion, 149 unexpected rulings either

149. For example, in the recently concluded Boeing v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. litigation, the jury
was presented with a complex questionnaire to answer. The jury rendered a verdict seemingly
holding that only half the potential policy periods were obligated to pay for the clean-up at the

Western Processors site, which Boeing estimated to be in the $100,000,000 range. Apparently, the
jury, who had been asked to determine whether the claims were expected and intended, and hence
excluded, had a reached a Solomonic decision to "split the baby" and affix responsibility for cleanup on both sides. However, the jury did not, apparently, know of joint and several liability, which
arguably made the insurers in the periods selected potentially responsible for the entirety of clean-up
costs.
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as to discovery, the evidence which may be offered at trial, or the
ultimate verdict.
Because of the current uncertainties created by litigation and the
time and expense involved, litigation is obviously not an alternative
that either side would voluntarily select to resolve their disputes.
However, because of the high stakes, and the "all or nothing"
position taken by the parties, frequently no alternative other than
litigation may be possible for dispute resolution. Costly and lengthy
proceedings to resolve coverage disputes do not generally afford a
prompt means to remedy contamination. A realistic evaluation of
the nature and purpose of insurance, and flexibility by both sides,
to arrive at interim solutions to enable funding without posturing
would better facilitate dispute resolution.
To favor the public interest in' dispute resolution, decisions
accepted as reasonable by both parties-must be made and a speedy
dispute resolution process must be created. The starting point for
any resolution to be perceived as "fair" requires communication
of needed information by both insureds and insurers. Both insurers
and insureds have, on occasion, objected to alternative dispute
resolution.
VII. CONCLUSION

Whether coverage exists for environmental clean-up claims is
subject to considerable uncertainty. Resolution of coverage issues
will often turn on very technical legal arguments. Because of
potential bases for non-coverage, both the insured and the insurers
should recognize pragmatic considerations that favor resolving any
coverage disputes to enable the clean-up proceedings to be
concluded at the earliest opportunity. A fair and reasonable
approach by both insureds and insurers toward establishing
meaningful communication, coverage positions, and a prompt
resolution of disputes may well reduce uncertainty as to
environmental issues.

